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ABSTRACT 
Others have investigated separately whether general pretrial publicity (PTP) or racial salience 
have an impact on juror decision making, but no one has explored a potential connection 
between the two. With information about the Black lives matter (BLM) movement recurring in 
the media, the question arises of whether news about the BLM movement can increase racial 
salience, thereby influencing juror decision making. The present research addressed whether 1) 
exposing participants to pro-BLM or negative-BLM news articles would influence verdicts and 
guilt ratings when compared to a control group, 2) whether this PTP effect would be different for 
Black versus White defendants, and 3) whether racial attitudes or attitudes toward police would 
mediate the relationship. To assess these questions, I conducted a two-part study in which 
participants read three newspaper articles that included either a pro-BLM article, a negative-
BLM article, or a control article in addition to two distractor articles. Three days after 
completion, participants listened to an audio recording of a mock trial with a description of either 
a Black or a White defendant and viewed a mugshot that corresponded to the description. 
Participants then rendered their verdict, provided a likelihood of guilt rating, and responded to 
the Perceptions of Police Scale and Color Blind Racial Attitude Scale. No effects for race or PTP 
were found; however, a significant effect was found for defendant picture. This finding 
highlights the complexity of potential factors in juror decision making by indicating that 
defendant appearance may have played a greater role than either race or PTP. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The term “Black lives matter” was first used in 2012 following the acquittal of George 
Zimmerman for the murder of Treyvon Martin, a 17-year-old Black high school student 
(McLaughlin, 2016). It began as a social media hashtag (Freelon, McIlwain, & Clark, 2016) but 
quickly gained exposure and became a cry at protests. What was initially a simple phrase turned 
into a sociopolitical movement following the police-involved shooting of another unarmed Black 
youth, Michael Brown (McLaughlin, 2016). It has only grown as a movement since, as more 
cases of racially-motivated injustice are perceived to have occurred such as the cases of Alton 
Sterling who was shot while being restrained on the ground and Philando Castile who was shot 
during a traffic stop (Donnella, 2016). 
The Black Lives Matter Movement (henceforth BLM movement) is centered around the 
concept of justice for Blacks. Essential to the discussion within the movement is the view that 
the criminal justice system is biased against Black people. Injustice is believed to occur at either 
the police level, as in the cases of Michael Brown or Tamir Rice (a 12-year-old boy shot by 
police), later in the court system as in the acquittal of George Zimmerman for the death of 
Treyvon Martin, or sometimes both as in the decision of a grand jury to not indict officer Darren 
Wilson for the death of Michael Brown. 
The BLM movement has seen extensive media coverage, and it has become more visible 
as new cases arise or protests are arranged. The BLM movement wields its influence via the use 
of media in a variety forms, such as television, newspapers, websites, blogs, and social 
networking platforms like Twitter and Facebook. Changing public sentiment through this media 
exposure is one of the methods by which the movement seeks to stop injustice. However, as is 
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common to any emotionally-charged movement, there have been negative reactions as well, 
whether it is coverage and censure of violence breaking out in protests, or criticism from 
politicians and public figures.  
 Because the BLM movement pertains to criminal justice and is so visible in the media, it 
is possible that the movement impacts decision-makers in legal proceedings. For example, could 
BLM-related media have an impact on jury decision making, either by increasing juror 
awareness of the issues or by changing juror perceptions of the justice system in which they are 
participating? BLM media could potentially affect trials of either Black or White defendants, 
depending on jurors’ consumption and reception of the information. It is important for us to 
better understand the potential impact of BLM media on juror decision making, as such news 
stories might impact high stakes criminal proceedings, perhaps even threatening defendants’ 
rights to an impartial jury. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Media and the Courts 
The potential influence of media on trial outcomes (particularly juries) has long pitted 
criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury against the media’s 
First Amendment right of free speech. This fundamental, constitutional concern regarding the 
balance between due process and free speech remains salient in the American court system today 
and promises to remain a concern among legal actors as new forms of media evolve and 
propagate. The Supreme Court has ruled on several landmark cases that serve as precedent to aid 
the courts in balancing between the rights of free-press and fair-trial—below I review some of 
these cases. 
Not until the 1960’s did the Supreme Court recognize the potential for pretrial publicity 
(henceforth, PTP) to harm a defendant’s right to a fair trial. In Irvin v. Dowd (1961), a murder 
suspect (Irvin) was reported by the media to have confessed to six murders. Although Irvin was 
given a change of venue to a nearby county because of the publicity, two-thirds of the jurors 
involved in the trial admitted that they believed Irvin was guilty prior to hearing evidence.  
Because of the confessions of these jurors during jury selection, the Supreme Court later 
overturned the original guilty verdict, marking the Court’s recognition that excessive PTP can 
undermine the legal assumption that potential jurors are not biased by previous knowledge of a 
case—even when the jurors claim not to be biased. In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court 
overturned a conviction in which the defendant had been denied a change of venue request 
following the television broadcast of a videotaped confession (Rideau v. Louisiana,1963). In the 
landmark case of Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966), journalists were present in the courtroom and the 
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case was publicized in several newspapers. What made this case distinct is that, along with the 
ruling that the defendant had been denied a fair trial due to biased media coverage which was 
deemed preventable, the Supreme Court also offered guidelines to assist judges in preventing 
legal bias such as setting rules for journalists in the courtroom. 
The Supreme Court (e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 1966) has suggested solutions for the 
problem of PTP, including careful voir dire to select unbiased jurors, judicial instructions to limit 
the influence of PTP, a continuance (delay of trial), or a change of venue/venire to gain jurors 
who have not been exposed to the same volume of PTP. However, there is no official standard 
for how to handle prejudicial PTP and at what point it begins to violate the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury. Furthermore, a trial court’s obligation to uncover 
bias during jury selection in highly publicized cases is relatively limited (Mu’Min v. Virginia, 
1991). In Mu’Min, the defendant was on trial for a murder that had been committed in prison. 
The defense intended to ask specific questions during voir dire about the content of publicity that 
potential jurors might have encountered, but the judge did not allow it and the defendant was 
ultimately found guilty and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court upheld that while a 
defendant had the right to ask whether jurors had been exposed to PTP and if they could remain 
impartial, the defendant does not have a constitutional right to ask questions about specific 
content of the publicity.  
Clearly, the history of caselaw addressing PTP suggests that the courts perceive it as a 
potential threat to criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights. Additionally, more recent cases 
underscore the Supreme Court’s continued concern that PTP is negatively impacting legal 
proceedings (e.g., Skilling v. United States, 2010). What does research tell us about the impacts 
of PTP on jury decision making? 
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Research on PTP Effects and underlying Mechanisms  
Researchers have been examining the impact of prejudicial PTP on juror decision making 
since the mid 1960s. Much of the early research on the subject was conducted to provide 
evidence of a need for a continuance or a change of venue, and many studies were simply 
surveys of jury-eligible people within a community where a court-case was ongoing and the PTP 
in question was being read in the daily news or seen on television. More valuable were 
experimental studies of PTP that examined the impacts of different types of information 
presented in PTP, including evidence of a defendant’s confession, connecting the defendant to a 
weapon from the crime scene, the defendant’s prior criminal record, and other defendant 
characteristics (Deluca, 1979; Hvistendahl, 1979; Otto, Penrod, & Dexter, 1994; Sue, Smith, & 
Gilbert, 1974; Tans & Chaffee, 1966). Meta-analytic techniques have revealed robust evidence 
that negative PTP about a defendant can increase guilty verdicts; furthermore, the same research 
suggests that increasing the realism of research paradigms (e.g. real-life stimuli, community 
samples) can magnify the impacts of PTP on jurors’ judgments (Steblay, Besirevic, Fulero, & 
Jiminez-Lorenz, 1999). 
Researchers have applied several frameworks for understanding why prejudicial PTP has 
an impact on jurors, stemming from both cognitive and social psychology. For example, PTP 
might impact jurors via source memory errors, cognitive accessibility of PTP information, pre-
decisional distortion, or perhaps even through a process dubbed “conformity prejudice.” I discuss 
these theories below. 
Source memories are people’s memories of where information was learned, and they 
allow us to evaluate the information based on our perception of the source. Sometimes, though, 
people experience source memory errors in which they either fail to remember how they came to 
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know something, or incorrectly remember the source (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). 
Jurors are supposed to weigh the evidence presented in court and ignore outside information, but 
when a juror cannot remember if the information was courtroom evidence or external 
information (e.g., PTP), it may be difficult to avoid bias. In a relevant study testing this 
proposition, Ruva, Mccavoy, and Bryant (2007) gave participants PTP to read, followed by a 
trial transcript that contained ambiguous evidence. Jurors later demonstrated errors in their 
ability to recall the source of each piece of information, although they maintained confidence in 
their memories. Participants who read PTP were more likely to give a guilty verdict and higher 
guilt ratings than were those in the no PTP control group—notably, the effect of PTP on guilt 
ratings was mediated by critical source monitoring errors. 
Cognitive accessibility may also be linked to PTP’s effect on jurors’ decisions (Kovera, 
2002). The theory suggests that ideas can become more cognitively accessible by way of recent 
exposure or relative personal importance, making such ideas/issues more likely to influence 
decision making. Kovera tested whether cognitive accessibility was linked to juror decision 
making, but ultimately was unable to connect the two. However, the subject used in the study 
(rape) appeared to be a highly accessible construct at the outset, which may have influenced the 
results and begs further research. 
Pre-decisional distortion is a juror’s tendency to be biased toward evidence supporting 
their currently-favored verdict as the trial progresses; jurors will either reinterpret or discard 
information if it does not support their current understanding (Carlson & Russo, 2001). Jurors 
may do this out of a desire the narrative of the case to remain consistent. Inconsistency creates a 
sense of conflict, so jurors will consider new information as part of the overall story rather than 
based on its own merit. First impressions, then, are critical, as they may guide understanding 
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throughout the remainder of the trial. If the first impression of a case (or defendant) is derived 
from PTP, then the entire trial may be compromised because jurors interpret material in a way 
that supports their initial leaning. 
Another mechanism is conformity prejudice. Conformity prejudice occurs when a juror is 
influenced by strong community opinion about a trial, perhaps making them unable to maintain 
impartiality (Vidmar, 2002). Whether the pressure is indirect or explicit, it can be difficult for 
jurors to ignore community sentiment, particularly when the juror must face community 
members during or after the trial. Media is one way in which community opinion or outrage can 
be communicated, and thus PTP may serve as the delivery device by which jurors understand 
community sentiment regarding the case. To test this proposition, Zimmerman, Rodriguez, 
Bergold, and Penrod (2016) conducted a study using an article describing community 
outrage/victim-impact as a PTP manipulation. They found that those jurors exposed to 
community outrage/victim-impact articles prior to a mock trial video produced higher guilt 
ratings than those not exposed to the community outrage articles; notably, the manipulation did 
not contain any defendant-specific information, i.e. the types of PTP “facts” that typically 
influence jurors in PTP research.  
 
General PTP 
While conducting research on the impact of eyewitness evidence on jury decision 
making, Greene and Loftus (1984) noticed that the mock jurors who participated during later 
dates were less likely to render a guilty verdict than were those who participated at the beginning 
of data collection. They discovered that a real-life, highly publicized court case had influenced 
many of the later participants. In this case, an eyewitness had falsely identified a man who was 
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subsequently acquitted when the true perpetrator confessed. Greene and Loftus (1984) followed 
up with another round of data collection three months later when the publicized case was less 
prominent in the minds of their participants. They also conducted a second experiment that used 
a case similar to the one used in the original experiment, comparing verdicts between those who 
had read an article about a false conviction and those who had not. While the details of the two 
publicized cases showed little relation to those of the experiments, the real cases still appeared to 
have some influence on the experimental ones in both studies. Greene and Loftus (1984) termed 
this phenomenon “general PTP” and used this term to describe any highly-publicized media that 
is not specific to the trial in question but which might still sway a jury’s decision-making. 
In subsequent years, researchers began to unpack the effects of general PTP on juror 
decision making, although such research was sparse compared to investigations of case-specific 
PTP. Greene and Wade (1988) continued to explore the influence of general PTP by asking 
whether different types of general PTP could generate different results, and whether the 
participants were influenced by having read about a misidentification or more generally by 
reading about a miscarriage of justice. In their first experiment they found that mock jurors were 
less likely to render a guilty verdict when shown an article about an eyewitness misidentification, 
but no more likely than the control group to render a guilty verdict when faced with an article 
about a heinous crime spree. In their second experiment, they observed that participants were 
more influenced by cases similar to their own as well as whether the guilty-verdict in the article 
was reported to have been later confirmed by confession of the defendant or disconfirmed by 
confession of the true perpetrator. Combined, these results indicate that type of media does have 
an impact, but jurors are more easily swayed toward leniency than they are towards offering a 
guilty verdict.  
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Mullin, Imrich, and Linz (1996) tested the effects of general PTP on jurors in an 
acquaintance rape mock trial. Participants read an article about acquaintance rape in which men 
are portrayed as being predatory and a week later participated in a mock trial. While their 
hypothesis had been that the general PTP exposure would increase pro-prosecution leanings, the 
results were the opposite – but only for men. General PTP did not affect women, but men in the 
PTP condition were significantly more pro-defense. A follow-up experiment exposed 
participants to either the predatory portrayal article or an article which emphasized male-female 
miscommunication. The results for the predatory portrayal were replicated with men leaning 
more pro-defendant while women remained neutral, but the effects were not seen among men in 
the non-predatory condition. These experiments suggest that juror demographics can interact 
with the influence of general PTP on decision making.  
In contrast to previous studies, Kovera (2002) designed research that focused more on 
identifying and explaining the mechanisms through which general PTP influences juror decision-
making. Kovera found that pre-existing attitudes moderate the impact of general media on juror 
decision making, including juror requirements for sufficient evidence to convict. The primary 
means by which media influences judgement appeared to be, at least in this research, the 
standard of evidence that jurors hold; that is, people changed their standards as a function of 
media exposure. Kovera found no indication that either cognitive accessibility or spreading 
activation (measured by shortened reaction time for the social constructs deemed related to case 
details) were connected to judgements of subject importance, indicating that other mechanisms 
must be mediating the relationship between general PTP exposure and guilt judgments. 
In another examination of the moderating effects of individual attitudes and 
characteristics on PTP effects, Woody and Viney (2007) conducted a study using sexual assault 
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media that was pro-prosecution, pro-defense, neutral, or absent to investigate if general PTP had 
a differential effect on men versus women in judgments of a sexual assault trial. While there was 
only a small significant main effect for the PTP conditions, there was a significant interaction 
between PTP condition and gender. When sexual assault media was absent, women were 
significantly more likely to convict, but when sexual assault media was present, gender 
differences disappeared. These results comport with other studies revealing gender differences in 
juror decision making on sexual assault cases, although the results also suggest that media 
exposure might disrupt such differences (e.g. McNamara, Vattano, & Viney, 1993). 
To date, there is not a large body of research examining general PTP. Except for the first 
two studies conducted by Greene and Loftus (1984) and Greene and Wade (1988), most of the 
studies on general PTP have focused on rape or sexual assault cases; this focus on cases 
involving sexual violence has brought to light the potential moderating influence of gender on 
the effects of general PTP, but other demographics such as race have not yet been taken into 
consideration when studying general PTP.  
 
Race, Jury Decision Making, and PTP 
Although there is a large amount of basic research examining racism and prejudice, there 
is relatively little research (especially experimental) examining the interaction between race and 
jury decision making. Sommers and Ellsworth (2000) conducted two studies comparing the 
different responses of Black versus White mock jurors in judging Black versus White 
defendants. In the first study, they found a significant interaction between juror race and 
defendant race when judging racially charged crimes, with White jurors showing little to no 
difference in their judgements but Black jurors being more likely to render a guilty verdict with 
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White defendants. In the second experiment, Sommers and Ellsworth attempted to further 
explain what was happening by testing for the impact of what they termed “racial salience.” 
They tested the impact of racial salience by manipulating whether or not the race of the 
defendant was made important or salient to the case by having a condition which indicated that 
the crime was racially-motivated or racially-charged and one that only listed the races of the 
defendant and victim as part of demographic descriptions. In the racially salient condition, 
results from the previous study were replicated. However, in the racially non-salient condition, 
the pattern changed; Black jurors continued their previous pattern, and White jurors were now 
more likely to give a guilty verdict to Black defendants than to White defendants.  
Sommers and Ellsworth (2000) interpreted their findings to be a reflection of aversive 
racism whereby egalitarian-minded White people have unconscious negative biases against 
people of color (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991). Aversive racists, when aware of racial norms or 
when considering the potential impact of race on a situation, will try to suppress their prejudices; 
however, when unaware, these prejudices will be expressed. Thus, in their second study, by 
reducing awareness of the potential impact of race in the non-salient condition, Sommers and 
Ellsworth induced White participants to express aversive racism. In contrast, Black participants 
appeared to be more uniformly pro-Black and willing to express their biases, perhaps because 
race and (anti-Black) racism are typically more salient to Black participants regardless of the 
situation. 
A handful of studies have examined the interaction between defendant race and PTP. In a 
content analysis of PTP found on televised news in Los Angeles, Dixon and Linz (2002) found 
that about 19% of the cases mentioned in the news contained potentially prejudicial information 
as defined by the American Bar Association. Of this 19%, Blacks and Latinos were twice as 
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likely as Whites to receive prejudicial publicity, while Latino-on-White crime was almost three 
times as likely to be the subject of prejudicial PTP. 
Fein, Morgan, Norton, and Sommers (1997) exposed mock jurors, 79% of which were 
White, to pro-prosecution PTP to investigate the interaction between race and PTP. Two features 
were manipulated to create a 2 (defendant was specified Black or not) x 2 (suspicion was cast on 
the legitimacy of the articles or not) + 1 (control condition) design. Three of the four conditions 
that received PTP were significantly more likely than the control group to convict the defendant; 
the fourth condition, which included the defendant’s race and raised suspicions regarding the 
legitimacy of the articles, had a conviction rate similar to that of the control group. The authors 
suggested aversive racism might account for their findings, as aversive racists typically believe 
themselves to be unbiased and do not believe themselves to be racist—yet still unconsciously 
hold negative beliefs and feelings about other races (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991). In this study, 
then, those who knew the race of the participant were unaware that it might bias them until the 
potential bias was pointed out to them. 
In another study, Clow, Lant, and Cutler (2013) examined the impact of specific PTP on 
participant verdicts for White, Black, or Aboriginal defendants in a mock sexual assault trial in 
Canada. Their results indicated that participants were least likely to convict the Black defendant 
of the three ethnicities. In a significant interaction with participant gender, women were more 
likely to judge the Aboriginal defendant guilty than they were either of the other races. Clow et 
al. (2013) suggested that their findings comport with the Fein et al. (1997) results, in that female 
participants were trying to adjust for a known societal bias against Blacks, but without the 
awareness that these same prejudices can exist against other minorities (see Dovidio, Gaertner, 
Kawakami, & Hodson, 2002). 
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These studies have provided a glimpse into the interaction between race and case-specific 
PTP. They have shown that both defendant and juror race can impact juror decision making and 
can interact with the effects of case-specific PTP, although the effects that have been found are 
inconsistent. If racial salience is an underlying mechanism that determines the circumstances in 
which White jurors express bias against Black (or non-White) defendants, then it seems likely 
that general PTP, like case specific PTP, should have an impact of some sort on White jurors’ 
decisions about Black defendants. However, research on general PTP and race has not yet been 
conducted, and there is a surprisingly shallow understanding amongst researchers about the 
construct of “race salience” and the boundary conditions for its potential impact on jurors 
(Sommers & Ellsworth, 2009). 
 
Race and Perceptions of Police 
Each shooting that has spurred the growth of the BLM movement has had both a racial 
element as well as police involvement, and there has been dissatisfaction with the legal outcomes 
of many of these cases. Conversely, with every protest and expression of outrage there has been 
a response of support for the police, with some using the phrase “blue lives matter” as an answer. 
Regardless of which side a person falls on, media pertaining to the BLM movement may impact 
attitudes toward police both negatively or positively; therefore, it is also important to gauge 
perceptions of police in order to understand the potential impact of BLM media on jurors’ 
decision making. 
Perceptions toward police appear to be influenced by race, with Blacks being more likely 
to hold a more negative perception of police than Whites (Dowler & Sparks, 2008; Lewis, 2016). 
More specifically, Blacks are more likely to believe that police use excessive force on a daily 
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basis, that minorities are more likely to be victimized by police, that police are more likely to use 
deadly force against a Black male than a White male, and that there is a need for police to be 
culturally competent (Lewis, 2016). For a review of research on attitudes toward police, see 
Brown and Benedict (2002). 
Attitudes about police can influence pretrial bias and first votes, which may through 
deliberation serve to sway the verdict that a jury renders—specifically, there is a positive 
correlation between trust in police and favoring the prosecution (Farrell, Pennington, & Cronin, 
2013). Additionally, while Blacks are overall less likely to trust the police, there is still a 
correlation between trust in police and pro-prosecution attitudes amongst Black people. In fact, 
the relationship between trust in the police favoring the prosecution is somewhat more 
accentuated for Blacks than it is for Whites. 
Overall, it appears that accounting for attitudes toward the police is necessary in an 
examination of the impact of BLM media on court proceedings. Does the BLM movement 
impact attitudes toward police? Does it reduce trust among supporters of the movement and 
increase trust among non-supporters? Might such biases only be activated under certain 
circumstances, like in the case of a Black defendant? 
 
Present Research 
The existing body of experimental studies examining race and jury decision making are 
surprisingly limited in scope, especially those pertaining to the conditions in which White jurors 
will exhibit bias against Black defendants. In a recent review article, Sommers and Ellsworth 
(2009) indicated a lack of breadth in research on racial salience amongst jurors, suggesting that 
the majority of existing research has examined racial bias among White mock-jurors in trials 
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about racially-charged crimes, which is just one potential way in which race can become 
“salient” in legal proceedings. Furthermore, a number of researchers have claimed to manipulate 
racial salience by simply making the jurors aware of the defendant’s race, a method that 
Sommers and Ellsworth suggest does not capture the core idea of racial salience. Sommers and 
Ellsworth argue that a proper examination of the broader concept of “race salience” would 
require numerous operationalizations across multiple methodologies, and one such 
operationalization they mentioned was race-relevant PTP—as yet, manipulating racial salience 
through any form of PTP has yet to be attempted.  
There are also extensive gaps in the literature on general PTP; in particular, there has 
been little research that examines the impacts of general PTP on topics outside of sexual 
violence. No publications have covered experimental research to examine how the topic of race 
in general PTP impacts jurors, nor has anybody conducted experimental research on the 
interrelations between such PTP and attitudes toward police. Media about the BLM movement 
appears to qualify as general PTP under Greene and Loftus’s (1984) definition which uses the 
term to refer to any highly-publicized media not specific to the trial in question but which could 
influence a juror’s decision. 
Given the lack of research pertaining to the impact of racial salience and general PTP on 
juries, I wed the two topics and examined how general PTP about the BLM movement impacts 
jury decision making. In this study, I manipulated the type of PTP (pro-BLM, anti-BLM, and 
neutral non-BLM articles) that participants were exposed to as well as the defendant’s race 
(Black or White). I also measured racial attitudes and perceptions of police to better understand 
how such attitudes interact with or mediate the impacts of PTP on guilt judgments. 
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Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Race and PTP will interact on verdicts.  In the pro-BLM condition, 
participants will render more guilty verdicts for White than Black defendants.  In the anti-BLM 
condition, participants will render more guilty verdicts for Black than White defendants.  In the 
non-BLM condition, participants will also favor White defendants because race has not been 
made salient.  
Hypothesis 2: Race and PTP will interact on guilt ratings.  In the pro-BLM condition, 
participants will assign a higher likelihood of guilt for White than Black defendants.  In the anti-
BLM condition, participants will assign a higher likelihood of guilt for Black than White 
defendants.  In the non-BLM condition, participants will also assign a higher likelihood of guilt 
for Black than White defendants because race has not been made salient.  
Hypothesis 3:  Race and PTP will interact on attitudes.  In the pro-BLM condition, 
participants will exhibit fewer colorblind racist attitudes and less support for the police.  In the 
anti-BLM condition, participants will exhibit more colorblind racist attitudes and more support 
for the police.  In the non-BLM condition, participants will also exhibit more colorblind racist 
attitudes and more support for the police.  
Hypothesis 4: Scores on the attitudes’ scales will mediate the relationship between BLM 
media exposure and verdicts/guilt ratings. 
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METHOD 
 
Participants and Design 
The final sample consisted of White jury-eligible undergraduate students at Missouri 
State University recruited through Sona, the campus participant pool. Each participant was 
randomly assigned to a condition in a 2 (Defendant Race: Black vs. White) x 3 (PTP Condition: 
positive BLM article exposure vs. negative BLM article exposure vs. no BLM article exposure) 
design. The final sample included 195 participants, 74% female, with a mean age of 19 (see Data 
Screening section and Table 1 below for more demographics). This experiment was approved by 
the Protection of Human Subjects Institutional Review Board on October 29th, 2017, per 
university policy (see appendix A). 
 
Materials 
Media Exposure Materials. Using Qualtrics, I gave participants three articles to read 
prior to the experimental manipulation. All participants read two of three possible neutral 
distraction articles: one about law changes that restrict home renovations, one about the 
successful separation of a pair of conjoined twins, and one about a virtual personal assistant 
(technology). In the negative BLM condition, participants read an article that is critical of the 
BLM movement by discussing protester violence, arguing that BLM supporters are hypocritical, 
and pointing out that this environment is creating fear among police that hinders them in the 
execution of their duties. In the positive BLM condition, participants read an article that supports 
the BLM movement by giving the narrative of a recent example of the shooting of an innocent 
Black man, in addition to explaining research that supports the assertion that the police unfairly  
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Table 1 
Demographics 
 N % 
Gender   
Female 142 73% 
Male 53 27% 
   
Race (pre-exclusion)   
Did not Respond 33 13% 
American Indian or Alaska Native 2 1% 
Asian 1 <1% 
Black or African American 7 3% 
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 1 <1% 
Other 1 <1% 
Two or more races 12 5% 
White 199 78% 
   
Ethnicity   
Hispanic 4 2% 
Non-Hispanic 191 98% 
   
Income   
Less than $20,000 181 93% 
$20,000 or more 14 7% 
   
Political Leaning   
Liberal or Extremely Liberal 31 16% 
Slightly Liberal 24 12% 
Moderate 66 34% 
Slightly Conservative 34 17% 
Conservative or Extremely Conservative 39 20% 
   
Religion   
Agnostic 17 9% 
Atheist 11 6% 
Christian 152 78% 
Other 13 7% 
Pagan 1 1% 
Note: Age, which was not included in this table, had a mean of 19 and a range of 18-45.  
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target Blacks. In the no BLM article condition, participants read all three distractor articles. Each 
article was followed by a manipulation check to ensure that participants actually read and 
comprehended the articles. This manipulation check consisted of having participants answer a 
brief comprehension questionnaire consisting of three items after each article, giving a total of 
nine questions that participants had to respond to. Those who failed more than one of the 
questions on the questionnaire were excluded (See Appendices B, C, D, E, and F for articles). 
Mock Trial Audio Recording. I used an audio recording of a mock trial that is a 
modified version of a real trial, adapted for use in a previous unpublished study. This mock trial 
uses the voices of six individuals with whom the participants would not have interacted. The 
audio transcript was paired with subtitles in a video format and then embedded into a second 
Qualtrics questionnaire.  
In the case, the defendant Donald Ray Braswell is charged with armed robbery and 
assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. The mock trial lasts approximately 
twenty-eight minutes and contains eyewitness testimony for the prosecution, testimony from a 
friend of the defendant offering an alibi, and testimony from the arresting officer who discusses 
the lineup procedure used for the eyewitness identification. There are also closing arguments 
from the defense and prosecution, along with realistic instructions to the jury delivered by the 
judge. 
 I used two different versions of the mock trial to partially deliver the defendant race 
manipulation. In one version, the eyewitness describes the defendant as Black and mentions that 
one of the lineup members was White. In the other version, the eyewitness describes the 
defendant as White and mentions that one of the lineup members was Black. Beyond these 
differences, the two recordings are identical. (See appendix G for a transcript of the mock trial). 
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Defendant Race Manipulation. Through random assignment half of the participants 
were exposed to the version of the mock trial audio recording that describes the defendant as 
White and half were given a mock trial audio recording that describes the defendant as Black. To 
increase awareness of race in the case to better reflect a real trial, participants were also given a 
picture of the defendant which was displayed directly above the embedded video for the duration 
of the trial. Booking photos of six different men were selected to represent the defendant, three 
of whom are White and three of whom are Black. I used stimulus sampling by randomly 
assigning each participant one of the three photos corresponding to the race of the defendant. 
(See appendix I for photos of the defendants.) 
Verdict Form. After participants listened to the mock trial audio recording, they filled 
out a verdict form. This form required the participant to judge the defendant as either guilty or 
not guilty. Additionally, participants rated their perception of the defendant’s likelihood of guilt 
and their confidence in their verdict. Lastly, participants rated their perceptions of the 
testimonies and the attorneys using bipolar adjective scales. (See appendix H for verdict form). 
Attitude Scales. Following the completion of the verdict form, in order to gauge attitudes 
about race and the police, I administered the Color-Blind racial attitude scale (CoBRAS) 
(Neville, Lilly, Lee, Duran, & Browne, 2000) and the Perceptions of Police scale (POPS) (Nadal, 
& Davidoff, 2015). The CoBRAS has a Guttman split-half reliability of .72 and a test-retest 
reliability of .68 and is rated on a scale of 0-100, with twenty statements. An example statement 
is “Race plays an important role in who gets sent to prison.” The POPS has good internal 
consistency with an overall Cronbach’s alpha of .92.  Respondents rate agreement with 
statements such as “The police are trustworthy,” and it has twelve questions with total scores 
ranging from 0-48 (See appendices J and K for attitude scales). 
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Demographics. At the end of the first part of the study, participants filled out a 
demographics questionnaire. This form asked participants about gender, ethnicity, age, marital 
status, child status, income level, political leaning, and hometown. Additionally, after the second 
part I asked questions to determine jury eligibility, including whether the participant is a U.S. 
citizen with valid license, and whether they have ever been convicted of a felony, as well as if 
they have served on a jury or not. (See appendix L for demographic questionnaire). 
 
Procedure 
I recruited participants using Missouri State University’s research participant platform 
Sona. Upon signing up for a two-part study entitled “Reading Comprehension and the Media,” 
participants were provided a link to the Qualtrics questionnaire with the first consent form (see 
Appendix M), the media exposure articles, and the comprehension questionnaire—participants 
were not aware that they would play the role of jurors in the second session. Three days after 
receiving the media exposure materials and completing the comprehension questionnaire, 
Qualtrics was automated to send a link to the second half of the study on Qualtrics, which 
included the mock trial audio recording, verdict questionnaire, and attitude scales. Participants 
completed their second consent form (see Appendix N) that revealed they would be participating 
in a mock trial and viewed a photo of the defendant and the video/audio of the mock trial. A 
timer was embedded in the mock trial page that prevented participants from clicking “next” until 
after the duration of the trial had passed; this was intended to help prevent participants from 
simply clicking through. The next page contained the verdict form described above.  
Following the completion of the trial material, participants were asked to fill out the 
CoBRAS and POPS. I then asked them if they had any suspicions about the purpose of the study, 
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with a textbox for them to provide an answer. Lastly, on a separate page, I asked participants 
what the race of the defendant was. I later compared their responses with the condition that they 
were part of and used it as a manipulation check to ensure that the participant had actually 
observed the race of the defendant. Following the completion of the survey, participants were 
given the option of continuing to another, unconnected questionnaire where they could enter to 
win one of two $100 gift cards. All participants who completed the study were also awarded 
three participation credits. 
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RESULTS 
 
Analytic Strategy 
I analyzed the data using R version 3.5.1 in RStudio (R Core Team, 2018) utilizing the 
packages lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015), lmerTest (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & 
Bojesen, 2017), dplyr (Wickham, François, Henry, & Müller, 2018), Hmisc (Harrell, 2018), ez 
(Lawrence, 2016), and DHARMa (Hartig, 2018).  Dependent variables were dichotomous verdict 
(Guilty, Not Guilty) and ratings of likelihood of guilt (0-100).  I used multilevel models to 
analyze the dichotomous outcome verdict, and a series of linear mixed models to analyze guilt 
ratings. I used multilevel models (binary logistic regression and linear) because stimulus (i.e., 
which photo participants viewed) needed to be controlled for statistically. I included stimulus as 
an independent variable with a random intercept in the models, allowing me to investigate the 
impact of race while allowing the different individual pictures to vary in their baseline scores.  I 
analyzed the dependent variables separately using defendant race (Black, White), PTP exposure 
(Positive, Negative, Control) as independent variables, testing for main and interactive effects. 
Models were compared for best fit using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1974) with 
a minimum two-point lower AIC indicating the better model. 
I conducted 2 (Race: Black, White) X 3 (PTP: Positive, Negative, Control) between 
subjects factorial ANOVAs on each of the two attitude scales to test whether attitudes were 
influenced at all by the manipulations. I had originally intended to conduct a mediation analysis 
to test whether POPS or CoBRAS scores mediated the relationship between the conditions and 
guilt ratings, but PTP condition was not a significant predictor of attitudes or guilt ratings, 
rendering a mediation analysis unnecessary. I also used chi-square tests and one-way ANOVAs 
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to test whether several extraneous variables needed to be statistically controlled (see preliminary 
analysis). 
 
Data Screening 
Of the 314 participants who completed both parts of the study, 195 were analyzed (see 
Figure 1 below for the participant exclusion process). 
 
Figure 1. Participant Exclusion Process 
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 Some were removed for failing manipulation checks (part one manipulation checks 
involved correctly answering two of three questions about the target article, while the part two 
manipulation check was simply answering the question: “what was the race of the defendant?”), 
some were removed for multiple attempts with multiple condition assignments. Five were 
removed for not being jury-eligible (U.S. Citizen and non-felon). Finally, given the importance 
of race in this study and the racial demographics of the participant pool being predominantly 
White, I decided a priori to focus analyses on White participants. Removing minority and 
nonreporting participants, 199 participants remained. I include the pre-removal racial 
demographics in Table 1 above with the other demographics.  
I tested the data for multivariate outliers using all quantitative variables that were used for 
analysis (guilt ratings, POPS scores) and time difference between parts one and two. I identified 
four multivariate outliers which I evaluated using mahalinobis distance values. Outliers were 
then removed, yielding a final sample of 195. I further checked the data for additivity, normality, 
linearity, and homogeneity. No assumptions were violated. 
 
Preliminary Analysis 
I first conducted analyses to determine if several extraneous variables affected verdicts or 
guilt ratings based on previous research (e.g. Greene & Loftus, 1984; Porter & Ten Brinke, 
2009). These included participant time between PTP exposure and viewing of the trial, defendant 
appearance, month of participation, gender, article presentation order, and hometown. Each of 
these variables were either included as a question in the study (gender and hometown), found in 
the study meta-data (time between PTP exposure and viewing of the trial, semester of  
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significant effects, ps > .66. participation), or manipulated in the study (defendant appearance, 
article presentation order). While the screening of most of these variables was a matter of sound 
research methodology, hometown was included because of the unique likelihood of having 
students from St. Louis, MO, where Michael Brown was killed by a police officer—an important 
point in the history of the movement. 
I conducted one-way ANOVAs predicting guilt for each of participant gender, order of 
article presentation, or participant hometown and found no significant effects, ps > .28. I also 
conducted a chi square test comparing verdicts and each of these variables and found no other 
None of these variables were included or controlled for in subsequent analyses. 
I tested for time between the PTP exposure of part one and the mock trial in part two. The 
mean time difference was 5.4 days, while the shortest (due to study design) was three days and 
the longest was 28 days. A majority (168) completed the second part no later than a week after  
viewing the PTP. A one-way ANOVA using time difference to predict guilt ratings was 
nonsignificant, F(1, 193) = 0.02, p=.87, R2 <.001. A binary logistic regression predicting verdict 
was also nonsignificant, χ2 (1) = 3.10, p = .08, Nagelkerke R2 = .02.  
Defendant appearance was significant for predicting both verdict and guilt ratings. The 
six pictures used to represent the defendant (three Black, three White) were significantly 
different from each other in predicting verdicts using a chi-square analysis, χ2 (1) = 15.06, p = 
.01. To identify which picture(s) held the most influence, I looked at the standardized residuals 
and found that only defendant one (Black) contributed substantially with a standardized residual 
of -3.58 indicating a stronger tendency toward not-guilty verdicts than predicted. The second 
highest standardized residual was 1.58 for defendant five (White) which falls short of two, a 
commonly used cut-off. The other two Black defendants (two and three) had standardized 
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residuals of 1.02 and 0.14 respectively, while the White defendants four and six had standardized 
residuals of 1.26 and -0.40 respectively, See Table 2 below for the breakdown of guilt ratings 
and conviction rates by picture. They were also significantly different in predicting ratings of 
guilt using a one-way ANOVA, F(5, 189) = 2.98, p = .01, R2 = .07. I performed independent t-
tests with a Bonferroni correction to take a closer look at the differences between defendant 
pictures and found only one picture was significantly different from others. Picture one (Black) 
had significantly lower likelihood of guilt ratings from picture four (White), p = .04, d = 0.77, 
and picture six (White), p = .01, d = 0.86. No other pairwise comparisons were significantly 
different in guilt ratings.  
 
Table 2 
 
Likelihood of Guilt and Conviction Rates by Defendant Picture 
 N Likelihood of Guilt Conviction Rate 
Picture 1 (Black defendant) 33 33.7 (26.8) 9% 
Picture 2 (Black defendant) 29 53.8 (33.3) 46% 
Picture 3 (Black defendant) 32 50.2 (29.7) 45% 
Picture 4 (White defendant) 35 55.5 (29.8) 38% 
Picture 5 (White defendant) 33 55.2 (28.2) 48% 
Picture 6 (White defendant) 33 58.4 (30.7) 33% 
Note: Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations. Likelihood of guilt ranged 0-100.  
 
One specific Black defendant (defendant one) was much less likely to be given a guilty 
verdict and received lower guilt ratings than any of the other defendants. Additionally, one White 
defendant (defendant six) was less likely to be given a guilty verdict but had the highest average 
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likelihood of guilt rating of any of the defendants. It is difficult to interpret these patterns, but it 
is possible that defendant one’s facial expression (potentially fearful) compelled leniency. See 
appendix I for the photos used.  To control for this variable, it was included in analyses with a 
random intercept. 
I also checked for differences by month to determine whether history affected 
participants’ responses. Month of participation was a significant predictor for verdict, χ2 (1) = 
11.74, p = .02, but not for guilt rating, F(4, 190) = 2.34, p = .06, R2 = .05. While it is likely this 
effect was random, there was a chance it was related to the release of a movie that contained 
themes related to the BLM movement in early October. Therefore, I opted to control for it 
statistically by including it in the verdict analyses with a random intercept. 
 
Analysis  
See Table 3 for full descriptives across experimental cells for both verdict and likelihood 
of guilt. Overall, the conviction rate for Blacks was 30%, whereas the conviction rate for Whites 
was 43%. The average conviction rate for the control group overall was 36%, compared to 40% 
for the negative, and 33% for the positive. See Figure 2 for a visual representation of the 
likelihood of guilt data. 
 
Hypothesis 1. To test the predicted interaction of PTP and Race on verdict and given the 
need to control for two variables while trying to achieve a balance between model fit and 
parsimony, I created several multilevel models using binomial distribution and a logit-link 
function including picture and month of participation with random intercepts and the 
independent (defendant race and PTP condition) as fixed effects. I compared these models using 
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Table 3 
Likelihood of Guilt and Conviction Rates as a Function of PTP Exposure and Defendant Race 
 Black Defendant White Defendant 
PTP Control Group n = 28 n = 34 
Likelihood of guilt 49.4 (34.0) 56.6 (28.9) 
Conviction rates 35% 37% 
   
Negative-BLM PTP Group n = 24 n = 34 
Likelihood of guilt 44.3 (28.0) 59.4 (29.4) 
Conviction rates 21% 55% 
   
Pro-BLM PTP Group n = 36 n = 30 
Likelihood of guilt 43.8 (31.3) 52.6 (30.0) 
Conviction rates 33% 33% 
Note: Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations. Likelihood of guilt ranged 0-100. 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean Likelihood of Guilt Rating Split by PTP Condition and 
Race Condition 
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AIC and log likelihood ratio tests contrasting them to their previous iteration forward from null. 
See model comparison in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 
Model Comparison 
Model df AIC log likelihood χ2 χ2 p 
Intercept only 1 257.74 -127.87 255.74   
Random Intercept for Defendant Picture 2 255.62 -125.81 251.62 4.12 .042* 
Random Intercept for Month 3 257.49 -125.74 251.49 0.14 .711 
Race, PTP, and Interaction 7 258.58 -122.29 244.58 6.91 .141 
Note: Each model lists only the variables added in that model but include variables contained in  
all previous steps. * = p < .05 
 
Based on AIC and a change in chi-square values, the model with the best fit contained 
only the random intercept for defendant picture. The first model contained only the intercept and 
was used for comparison purposes. The second model considered only the random effect of 
defendant picture. The third model included both defendant picture and participation month with 
random intercepts. The fourth and final model contained both the previously used random effects 
as well as defendant race and PTP condition, considering both main and interactive effects. 
The model containing only the random effects for defendant picture was significantly 
different from the null model, χ2 (1) = 4.12, p = .04 and had the lowest AIC. The model 
containing defendant picture and month as well as the model containing defendant picture, 
month, defendant race, and PTP condition were both nonsignificant. Therefore, the defendant 
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picture only model appeared to be the model of best fit. No other effects, random or fixed were 
significant in any model. See Tables 5 and 6 below for results.  
 
Table 5 
Random Effects Predicting Verdict 
Random Effects  χ2 df p 
Model 2: Defendant Picture  4.12 1 .042 
Model 3: Month  0.13 1 .711 
Note: Values are for individual predictor; Model 3 also includes the random intercept for 
Defendant Picture 
 
Table 6 
Fixed Effects Predicting Verdict 
Fixed Effects (model 4) b S.E. Wald p 
   Negative Condition -0.604 0.632 -0.956 .339 
   Positive Condition 0.105 0.560 0.188 .851 
   White Defendant 0.215 0.677 0.317 .751 
   Negative Condition: White Defendant 1.362 0.810 1.682 .093 
   Positive Condition: White Defendant -0.250 0.775 -0.322 .747 
Note: Model lists only the variables added in that model but includes the random effects from 
previous models as well. Also: Positive and Negative PTP conditions contrast against control 
while White defendant is in comparison to Black defendant. 
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Hypothesis 2. To gain a more fine-grained perspective on whether race and PTP had an 
impact on jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt and to test Hypothesis 2, I created several 
linear mixed models to test the impacts of defendant race and PTP condition, controlling for 
defendant picture with a random intercept on ratings of guilt (0-100%). The first model 
contained only the intercept and acted as a null comparison model. The second model contained 
the random effect of defendant picture only. The third and final model contained the random 
effect as well as the fixed effects of defendant race, PTP condition, and interactions. I compared 
these models using AIC and log likelihood ratio tests contrasting them to their previous iteration 
forward from null. See model comparison in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 
Model Comparison 
Model df AIC log likelihood χ2 χ2 p 
Intercept only 2 1889.2 -942.60 1885.20 -- -- 
Random Intercept for Defendant Picture 3 1887.9 -940.95 1881.90 3.32 .069 
Race, PTP, and Interaction 8 1893.2 -938.60 1877.20 4.70 .453 
Note: Each model lists only the variables added in that model but include variables contained in  
all previous steps. * = p < .05 
 
The model containing the random intercept for defendant picture was a slight 
improvement over the intercept only model when comparing AIC, but was not significantly 
better when compared with a likelihood ratio test, χ2 (1) = 3.32, p = .07. The model containing 
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the independent variables was also no better than the null model, and the individual effects were 
not significant. See Table 8 below for the results of the final LMM. 
 
Table 8 
Fixed Effects Predicting Likelihood of Guilt 
Fixed Effects (Model 3) B S.E. t p 
Negative Condition -3.761 8.136 -0.462 .644 
Positive Condition -3.917 7.647 -0.512 .609 
White Defendant 8.143 9.103 0.895 .422 
Negative Condition: White Defendant 6.605 10.956 0.603 .547 
Positive Condition: White Defendant -0.121 10.765 -0.011 .991 
Note: Values are for individual predictor; Model 3 also includes Defendant Picture. Also: PTP 
condition comparisons are comparing to the control group, while race comparisons are reported 
as White comparing to Black. 
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4. To test Hypothesis 3 and assess whether defendant race or PTP 
condition affected POPS and CoBRAS scores, I conducted two 2x3 between-subjects factorial 
ANOVAs using PTP condition and defendant race to predict each of the two attitude scales. I 
found no effect in the POPS model for race F(1, 189) = 0.01, p = .91, R2 < .001, PTP condition, 
F(2, 189) = 0.50, p = .60, R2 = .005, or their interaction, F(2, 189) = 0.18,  p= .82, R2 = .002. I 
also found no effect  in the CoBRAS model for race F(1, 189) = 1.44, p = .23, R2 = .007, PTP 
condition, F(2, 189) = 0.56, p = .57, R2 = .006, or their interaction, F(2, 189) = 0.22, p = .80, R2 = 
.002. I had originally intended to conduct a mediation analysis to test Hypothesis 4 and 
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investigate whether POPS or CoBRAS scores mediated the relationship between PTP exposure 
and guilt measures, but there were no significant effects of the manipulated variables on guilt 
measures. 
I also examined whether attitudes and guilt measure correlated (See Table 9 below). As 
expected, verdict and likelihood of guilt ratings had a strong positive correlation. Both verdict 
and guilt ratings were positively correlated with perceptions of police; specifically, those with 
more positive attitudes toward the police were more likely to render a guilty verdict. Verdict was 
negatively correlated with scores on the CoBRAS; specifically, those with lower scores 
(indicating more racist beliefs) were more likely to vote guilty. Lastly, POPS and CoBRAS were 
negatively correlated with each other, which indicates that in general those with more positive 
opinions of the police were more likely to endorse colorblind racist attitudes. 
 
Table 9 
 
Correlations between Verdict, Likelihood of Guilt, POPS, and CoBRAS Scores 
 
 Verdict* Guilt Ratings POPS CoBRAS 
Verdict*      —      
Guilt Ratings   .778***      —   
POPS   .154*  .173*      —  
CoBRAS  -.164* -.139 -.513***      — 
Note: Verdict is coded as not guilty = 0, guilty = 1 and correlations with verdict reflect 
Spearman’s rho, whereas all other correlations reflect Pearson’s r. 
*p<.05, **p<01, ***p<.001 (two tailed) 
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DISCUSSION 
 
 The purpose of this study was to investigate whether positive or negative general PTP 
about the BLM movement would influence verdicts and guilt ratings and whether racial attitudes 
or attitudes towards police would mediate the relationship. I included two manipulations: PTP 
condition (pro-BLM, anti-BLM, and control), and defendant race (Black and White) in the study 
design.  Analyses of the data showed no significant effects of the main independent variables on 
guilt measures, although one verdict model containing a random effect for defendant picture was 
significant. I discuss the results and implications below. 
   
PTP Exposure and Defendant Race 
 The data did not support my hypotheses. PTP did not affect verdicts or guilt ratings, nor 
did PTP did interact with defendant race in the way hypothesized (e.g. that positive PTP would 
decrease guilty verdicts for Black defendants in comparison to White defendants). Race also had 
no effect on guilt ratings or conviction rates. Furthermore, there was no evidence that scores on 
the attitudes’ scales were impacted by BLM media exposure. 
 
Defendant Picture 
 One defendant photo (the first Black defendant) was judged to be less guilty than two of 
the White defendants. While “stimulus” was not a variable of interest and may have interfered 
with my attempt at manipulating the construct of “race,” this result may contribute to previous 
literature that has suggested defendant appearance can play a role in juror decision making. 
There are several theoretical possibilities for why this effect arose in my study. 
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 Perceived Facial Masculinity. Physical attributes other than attractiveness can have a 
biasing impact on perceptions.  Estrada-Reynolds, Reynolds, McCrea, & Freng (2017) found that 
when a male defendant had more masculine features, participants rated him more likely to 
commit a violent crime. Additionally, participants also rated more masculine defendants as more 
likely to reoffend with another violent crime. It is possible that participants viewed defendant 
one as having fewer masculine features than the rest, particularly defendants four and six, and 
therefore were less likely to believe he would commit a violent crime.  
 Credibility Assessments. Another possible explanation is the dangerous decisions 
theoretical framework (Porter & Ten Brinke, 2009). According to this framework, facial reading 
and emotional expression can cause an individual to quickly make a so-called “dangerous 
decision” about another’s credibility.  This quick assessment is particularly likely for the 
personality domain of trustworthiness, which can potentially have a critical impact on a juror’s 
judgement regarding a defendant’s guilt. Korva, Porter, O’Connor, Shaw, and Ten Brinke (2013) 
found evidence for this in an experiment that showed mock jurors were significantly more likely 
to acquit a defendant whose photograph looked “trustworthy” than one whose photo did not. 
Defendant one may have appeared more trustworthy than the other defendants to participants, 
leading them to be less likely to convict him. 
 Defendant Emotional Responsiveness. Lastly, Antonio (2006) found that emotional 
responsiveness of the defendant during a trial impacted sentencing decisions. More specifically, 
if the defendant appeared sincerely sorry, jurors were more likely to select a life sentence over 
the death penalty, whereas seeming emotionally uninvolved during the proceedings was linked to 
a greater likelihood of being given the death sentence. While participants did not see the 
defendant’s face reacting during the trial, the picture that they viewed still conveys an emotion 
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which participants may view as the defendant’s emotional response to the trial.  In the current 
research, people might have perceived defendant one to appear remorseful or fearful, in turn 
resulting in more lenient responses. 
 All of these research findings and theories suggest that defendant appearance can play a 
role in juror decision making and can do so in multiple ways. People do not require anything 
more than a photograph to make judgements about an individual’s personality characteristics 
(Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972). They can make snap decisions about others based on brief 
exposure to a photo, but they also tend to stick to these judgements when given more time to 
look at the image and do so with increasing confidence (Willis & Todorov, 2006). Participants 
saw the photograph of the defendant potentially for the duration of the mock trial, giving them 
ample time to make assumptions about the defendant and become confident in these 
assumptions. Whether any one or combination of these theories is responsible for the results 
found in this study are unknown. It is still possible that these results are simply the expression of 
a reaction to a single idiosyncratic photograph rather than a statement of any larger pattern or 
meaning. 
 
Null Effect of Race 
 Race Salience.  Given that some previous research has shown White participants having 
a bias against Black defendants (e.g. Fein et al., 1997), why was there no significant effect for 
race? There are several possible reasons for this null effect, and this is by no means the first time 
a researcher has failed to uncover White juror bias. Sommers and Ellsworth (2000) showed in 
two experiments that when race was salient – that is, participants are not only aware of the 
defendant’s race, but race is also potentially relevant to the proceedings in one way or another 
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(e.g. the trial concerned a racially-charged hate crime), that White participants corrected for their 
biases and did not judge White and Black defendants differently. Only when race was nonsalient 
did White jurors demonstrate a pro-White bias.  In another study, Clow et al. (2013) investigated 
the interaction of PTP and defendant race and found that participants were least likely to convict 
the Black defendant of the three ethnicities examined. They interpreted the findings to mean that 
participants were adjusting for known societal biases against Blacks, which is theoretically 
similar to the “bias adjustment” account Sommers and Ellsworth (2000) produced. 
While in previous research racial salience has somewhat mitigated White bias, this effect 
has only been tested within a narrow set of methodologies that largely focus on racially-charged 
hate crimes (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2009). In the present research, I sought to manipulate racial 
salience by exposing participants to general PTP about the BLM movement. I wanted to 
determine whether the way in which race was made salient (positive or negative) would 
differentially affect White jurors’ judgments, and I did not expect to replicate the “typical” 
pattern uncovered in previous manipulations of salience. The intention was that one condition 
called into question the operation of the justice system in regard to Blacks, thereby making race 
an important factor (pro BLM), while the other condition would either fail to stimulate racial 
salience by not connecting race to injustice (control), or any racial salience would be overcome 
by the activation of in-group bias induced by the article (anti BLM). However, I found no 
difference between PTP groups. Had the control condition been different from the PTP 
conditions, one could have argued that the racial salience pattern had been replicated and that the 
negative-BLM article merely served to activate racial salience and did not negatively impact 
participants’ attitudes; however, there was no difference between control and either PTP 
condition, suggesting that racial salience was not supported in this study. One explanation for 
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this result is participants’ pre-existing awareness of their own potential biases. If participants 
were already aware of injustice towards Blacks within the judicial system and the potential for 
inadvertent racial bias then my attempt to induce racial salience would not have an impact if they 
were already aware of their own potential biases in a trial setting.  
Aversive Racism.  Aberson and Ettlin (2004) performed a meta-analytic review of 
research on racism and compared experiments in which participants favor the Black target with 
experiments where participants favor the White target. They found, in accordance with the 
aversive-racism paradigm, that when the experimental situation or evaluative criteria from which 
they were to base their decision was ambiguous, participants tended to favor the White target, 
whereas when the situation or evaluative criteria is less ambiguous and clearly favors an 
egalitarian response, participants will favor the Black target. 
 Aberson and Ettlin suggested several theories regarding the above pattern. One of these 
theories was simply prejudice inhibition; participants are aware of their own potential prejudices 
and are actively seeking to overcome any potential biases that they may exhibit due to one 
motivation or another. Additionally, Aberson and Ettlin suggest self-categorization theory, in 
particular self-categorization as a social group member. Participant behavior can be influenced 
by social group which can in turn be artificially influenced by researchers by manipulating the 
context. White participants might favor the White target automatically if White identity is the 
relevant attribute; however, participants can also choose to be in a non-prejudiced group as 
opposed to a prejudiced group. According to this theory, had the results for PTP followed the 
predicted pattern, participants in the negative-BLM group would self-categorize as White and 
would view Blacks as the out-group as opposed to participants in the positive-BLM group who 
would self-categorize as non-prejudiced, viewing prejudiced Whites as the outgroup. However, 
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this theoretical pattern was not supported by the data; the condition in which Blacks were least 
likely to be convicted was the negative-BLM condition suggesting that either this theory does not 
apply well to the current data, or that the negative-BLM article was better at inducing 
participants to adopt a non-prejudiced perspective, possibly as a reactance response the negative-
toward-Blacks bias found in the article. 
 Social Desirability.  Another potential explanation is social desirability bias. In social 
desirability bias, research participants respond less according to the reality of their own attitudes 
and beliefs and more according to what answers they believe will be viewed favorably by others. 
In this case, enough participants might have been concerned that they might be viewed as a racist 
if they convicted the Black defendant that they outweighed any bias other students not acting 
under social desirability bias might have displayed. 
Stimulus Effect.  One explanation for the lack of a race effect is the idiosyncratic effects 
of a specific photograph. There was a difference between the individual pictures used to 
represent the defendants, with the photograph of one particular Black defendant being less likely 
to be given a guilty verdict than two of the White defendants.  While multilevel models are 
generally good at handling correlated independent variables, it is still possible that the effect of 
defendant picture drowned out any effects I might have found for race, especially given that 
defendant picture is structured within the defendant race manipulation.  
Lack of Racial Bias.  Finally, the least complicated explanation for a lack of White juror 
bias in this study is simply that the participants do not have racial biases. The entire study was 
built around manipulating racial biases either in favor of Blacks or against them by using PTP 
exposure to engage racial salience and activate either positive or negative attitudes. However, the 
racial salience/aversive racism account collapses in the absence of latent racial biases. Even 
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within the control condition participants did not convict Blacks more than Whites, nor did they 
judge them more likely to be guilty. Had the participants been hiding latent racial biases, this 
result seems unlikely. Perhaps the null results for defendant race simply reflect a lack of bias 
amongst the students participating in the study.  
 
Null Effect of PTP Exposure  
PTP condition had no significant effect on guilt measures, but there is every possibility 
that participants were already being exposed to information about the BLM movement in their 
daily lives. It is also possible that PTP condition had no effect because of study procedure. While 
the lower limit was set for time between PTP exposure and mock trial (three days), the upper 
limit was not restricted, leaving participants seeing the PTP sometimes a few weeks before they 
finished the study which may have nullified any possible influence the PTP might have had. 
Additionally, previous literature demonstrating PTP effects have typically used case-specific 
PTP. Even in studies of general PTP, the media focused on the same type of crime that the mock 
jurors were judging during the trial. A threshold of relatedness may exist that requires the PTP to 
be at least somewhat similar to the case being judged. If this is true, then the current study may 
not have met this lower limit of relatedness, thereby failing to have an effect. 
 
Attitudes  
 While perceptions of police and colorblind racism were not different between race or 
PTP groups, they were both correlated with verdict, and perceptions of police was also correlated 
with guilt ratings. Basically, increased colorblind racism predicted increased support for the 
police, and both were associated with more convictions. Since one of the testimonies in the mock 
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trial was given by the arresting police officer, it is possible that this attitude may have caused 
participants to react more positively to the officer’s story and be more skeptical of the defense’s 
attempts to discredit his procedures. The positive correlation between perceptions of police and 
guilty verdicts might simply be because, as previous research has indicated, trust in police is 
positively correlated with support of the prosecution (Farrell et al., 2013). The connection 
between colorblind racism and verdict are a little less clear because there was no significant 
difference in colorblind racism scores between those in the White defendant condition and those 
in the Black defendant condition. A third variable may exist that explains both. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 There were a number of limitations related to this being an online study, including 
difficulty in controlling the amount of time between PTP exposure and mock trial as well as 
ensuring that the participant actually engaged with the material enough to reflect an accurate idea 
of what their behavior would be in a real trial. Outliers were removed, though, which included 
the four individuals who had the longest time between exposure and trial, and I tested to ensure 
that time between was not a significant predictor of verdict or likelihood of guilt. Additionally, 
the study was limited by the predominantly White participant pool which, while relatively 
reflective of the area in which the study was conducted, would not be reflective of all jury pools.  
However, I was primarily interested in White juror bias—a close examination of minority 
participants’ respondents to BLM PTP is a potential avenue for future research, but beyond the 
scope of the current research. 
One factor that I was forced to control for was defendant appearance. While I used 
multiple defendants to control for the potential that participants might respond differently based 
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on the appearance of the individual rather than because of his race, this type of sampling is not a 
fix all—in the current research, stimulus sampling ended up being a source of confusion. While 
defendant appearance may have caused difficulty in interpretation, the use of multiple pictures 
was still preferable to using a single stimuli to represent the construct “Black” or “White”. Had 
this not been controlled for in the design, it is possible that incorrect conclusions would have 
been drawn based on a single anomalous picture. 
 Future researchers may wish to take several steps to improve research quality. For one, it 
would be advisable to control for time between PTP exposure and mock trial, a problem that 
could be addressed by conducting the second session in-person instead of online. Additionally, 
future researchers may want to diversify their participant demographics to include minority 
participants and members of the community rather than relying on a student population. That 
said, in a review of jury research Bornstein (1999) found little difference between students and 
community members when acting as mock jurors. To investigate the possibility of external BLM 
exposure, a question at the end of the study might be included asking about it and the participants 
general awareness of the movement beforehand. Finally, to solve the picture dilemma it would 
be advised for future researchers to find new pictures to represent the fictional defendant and 
pilot the stimuli beforehand to ensure similar ratings across relevant trait judgment domains. 
 
Conclusion 
 The present research underscores the complexity of potential factors in juror decision 
making by showing a significant effect only for defendant picture, suggesting that defendant 
appearance may have played a greater role than race or PTP. While my hypotheses were not 
supported, this study still yielded some interesting information that might inform future research 
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on jury decision making. As for PTP, while inconclusive, the lack of of a PTP effect raises the 
question of whether there is there a threshold of relevancy for PTP to have an impact on jurors. It 
is my hope that this research will prompt other researchers to further explore the boundary 
conditions of PTP effects and their interaction with race. 
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Appendix B. Waterfront Distractor Article 
Imagine owning prime waterfront property, but you can’t do any repairs or remodeling. 
Homeowners are bracing for a decision that could drastically restrict development on the 
Northern California coast. Waterfront homes in Marin could soon be a steal, as long as you don’t 
mind taking them as-is. The plan could make even the smallest renovation — a huge headache 
for homeowners. 
But the California Coastal Commission tells KPIX that its plan is reasonable considering 
the danger posed by rising sea levels. Marin County has been working on its coastal plan for 
eight years but amendments the California Coastal Commission wants to make may mean those 
eight years are down the drain and threaten some coastal homes. 
Morey Nelsen picked the Seadrift community of Stinson Beach for its waterfront value, 
but that value could figuratively erode next month if the California Coastal Commission 
approves certain changes to the county’s coastal plan. “It’s going to drive my property values 
way down and then my ability to do any kind of maintenance — even put on a new roof,” Nelsen 
said. 
It comes down to two major changes, out of thousands. The California Coastal 
Commission is redefining certain flood zones according to the worst possible scenario that could 
happen 100 years from now, creating a much bleaker outlook for the future than the county’s 
plan. Secondly, because of that outlook, it would make most construction and maintenance on 
structures west of Highway 1 virtually impossible. 
Jeff Looman, sea level rise representative for Stinson Beach said, “What we feel is the 
staff of the CCC wants to take those and turn them into a case study all up and down the coast — 
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in a way the forces managed retreat. And that’s not something Marin County needs to be doing 
right now.” 
The communities of Point Reyes, Muir Beach, Tomales, Inverness, Marshall, Stinson and 
Bolinas would all be affected and all have united with the county against the commission’s 
recommendations. In the meantime, homeowners are rushing to get their work done before the 
commission meeting November 2nd in Half Moon Bay when this will be decided. 
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Appendix C. Conjoined Twins Distractor Article 
Erin and Abby Delaney were born conjoined at the top of their heads on July 24, 2016. 
On June 6, just shy of the twins’ first birthday, surgeons at the Children’s Hospital of 
Philadelphia conducted a successful 11-hour surgery to separate them. Since then, Erin and Abby 
have been recovering and continuing treatment. 
They’ve learned how to sit independently from one another, roll and crawl, and they 
spent their first birthday at the hospital, the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia reported. And 
they’re about to hit another milestone – they will be coming home soon. Heather and Riley 
Delaney, the twins’ parents, will get to take their girls home to Mooresville as early as 
November. Erin has been discharged from the hospital and Abby remains there while she 
continues to recover. 
Heather and Riley first learned the girls were conjoined in early 2016, about 11 weeks 
into Heather’s pregnancy. The twins’ condition was craniopagus, the least common type of 
conjoined twins. After that, the twins’ parents traveled to the Philadelphia hospital every two 
weeks for prenatal appointments. Erin and Abby were born 10 weeks prematurely. Delivered by 
cesarean section in the hospital’s Special Delivery Unit, each twin weighed 2 pounds and 1 
ounce, according to the hospital. The twins were separated at 10 months old. 
Heather moved into the hospital’s special maternity unit when she was 27 weeks 
pregnant to be closely observed, and transferred to the Philadelphia Ronald McDonald House 
sometime after that. Riley moved into his in-laws’ garage to save money, according to the report, 
and has been traveling back and forth from North Carolina and Philadelphia to visit the twins. 
“This is one of the earliest separations of craniopagus conjoined twins ever recorded,” 
Dr. Jesse Taylor, reconstructive surgeon, told the hospital. “We know that children heal better 
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and faster the younger they are; therefore our goal for Erin and Abby was separation as soon as 
possible with minimum number of surgeries.” 
After their separation surgery, the twins were closely cared for by their surgeons, 
nutritionists, developmental pediatricians and other specialists to ensure a successful recovery, 
the hospital said. The twins will return to Philadelphia over the next few years for more surgeries 
to replace the missing bone areas at the top of their heads and to adjust their hairlines, the 
hospital said. 
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Appendix D. Tech Distractor Article 
Entrepreneur Dennis Mortensen is finally ready to unleash Amy into the world. 
His startup x.ai has been developing Amy, an artificially intelligent personal assistant, for nearly 
three years. The software is meant to be a dream assistant, of sorts: It's professional, prompt and 
receptive to critiques. 
While Amy has already had some gushing reviews from her so-called employers, 
Mortensen has made her available up until now to only a closed group of users, for free. 
Now, he's putting a price tag on Amy and its counterpart Andrew. For $39 each month, anyone 
can buy the professional edition subscription to schedule unlimited meetings with an x.ai 
assistant. When cc'ed on an email, the assistant will take over by coordinating schedules and 
placing a meeting date on the calendar. 
 For the professional edition, users can select up to 10 VIP contacts who can email Amy 
directly to set up meeting. This means users don't have to go through the hassle of looping Amy 
into an email chain and verifying they'd like to set up a meeting. It's also possible to personalize 
the signature of the assistants, adding text to explain who it is. 
The company will eventually have three editions: Personal (free but has a 5 meetings per 
month limit), Professional and Business, which comes with an admin feature. People currently 
on the waitlist -- which x.ai says includes "hundreds of thousands" of people -- have the option to 
sign up for the Professional edition or wait for the Personal edition opening up sometime next 
year. 
Introducing Amy to the world hasn't come quickly. 
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Amy and Andrew have spent years learning from beta users. The pair has scheduled 
hundreds of thousands of meetings with the help of 53 x.ai staffers. (The company employs 
about 84 people). 
"We are fighting human ambiguity," Mortensen told CNNMoney, noting the challenges 
that an AI virtual assistant has to overcome. 
For example, when a person replies to an email at 2 a.m. and refers to "tomorrow," Amy 
might not know the respondent hasn't slept yet and "tomorrow" is technically today. Meanwhile, 
when a person replies to a separate email thread to confirm, cancel or change a meeting time, 
Amy can sometimes get confused. 
But Mortensen said the technology will continue to get smarter over time. 
"You're never at the end of it -- you never write the last piece of code," he said. 
Mortensen likened the learning curve to self-driving car technology. To start, there's little room 
for error in the minds of the public. A recent study from the University of Wisconsin found 
humans are less forgiving of automation than humans. 
"The idea of [consumer] forgiveness doesn't exist in this paradigm," Mortensen said. "But 
we need to have forgiveness." 
As both artificial intelligence and self-driving tech become more pervasive, the AI's level 
of work will get easier in some ways. That's because a mixed world of artificially intelligent 
assistants and human assistants creates more room for errors. 
Mortensen explained that when both assistants are Amys, there's no need to make 
assumptions about what a person is trying to convey. 
When it comes to mistakes with self-driving car technology, the impact is much graver: 
Human deaths. But for x.ai, it could mean losing customers. 
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The needs for both, however, are universally acknowledged, said Mortensen. 
"It's never argued that we don't need self-driving cars. [Similarly], there's no one that 
thinks about coordinating a meeting and [says to themselves], "I f------ love it," he said. 
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Appendix E. Anti-BLM Article 
Too many protestors choose to escalate tension and increase the likelihood of violence.  
Although Black Lives Matter purportedly began as a movement about ending fear 
amongst black Americans, it seems to have become something very different—and something 
perhaps more disturbing than the apparent trend of police shooting unarmed black men.  Black 
Lives Matter, or at least a nontrivial number of its proponents, has become a movement about 
instilling fear — sometimes in politicians, sometimes in “white people,” but mainly and most 
significantly in police.  
Last week, a gunman in Dallas opened fire on police at the end of a Black Lives Matter 
demonstration, killing five officers and wounding several others. Micah Johnson, the shooter, 
told a hostage negotiator that he was angry on behalf of Black Lives Matter and “wanted to kill 
white people, especially police officers.” Johnson’s Facebook page revealed an affinity for black 
nationalism, and he followed a Facebook group called the “African American Defense League,” 
which encouraged followers to “ATTACK EVERYTHING IN BLUE EXCEPT THE MAIL 
MAN” and “sprinkle Pigs Blood.”  
 It would make sense if, in the wake of Dallas, police officers across the country are 
frightened — and, indeed, they are. “How can you not be afraid?” Boston police sergeant Mark 
Parolin told the Boston Globe over the weekend. A beat officer, Sammy Mojica, told the paper, 
“Sometimes we feel like our hands are tied behind our backs and people are out to get us.” And 
that fear compounds what officers have felt for going on two years. In June of last year, the New 
York Daily News editorialized: “Fear has taken hold of the New York Police Department. The 
city’s cops have grown afraid to do their jobs.” Federal officials seemed to confirm that this year, 
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in May, when one suggested that the “viral video effect” has led police to retreat from carrying 
out their duties.  
Given the heightened passions surrounding the alarming deaths of Alton Sterling and 
Philando Castile, both shot dead by police last week, it was almost inevitable that this weekend’s 
protests would devolve into violence, and that’s precisely what happened. In Sterling’s Baton 
Rouge, 125 people were arrested; an officer struck with a projectile lost several teeth. In 
Chicago, protesters broke through a police barricade, and multiple people were arrested on 
charges of battery against police. And in Castile’s St. Paul, Minn., more than 100 protesters were 
arrested when protesters used an overpass over Interstate 94 to throw rocks and rebar at police, 
injuring 21 officers, including one who suffered broken vertebrae when a concrete block was 
dropped on him from above. When one officer was injured, protesters cheered: “One piggly-
wiggly down!” If police are even more fearful after this weekend, they would not be without 
reason.  
The rule of law is breaking down as riots erupt before the facts come in. The anti-cop 
movement has moved from attacking the police, to attacking the rule of law itself, and now it is 
attacking the fundamental human right of self-defense. Twice in a month, rioters have struck 
back after black cops reportedly shot and killed black men who were threatening the cops with 
guns.  
In Milwaukee, rioters burned businesses and cars after a black officer shot Sylville Smith. 
Milwaukee officials who reviewed the body-camera footage not only said that Smith was raising 
his gun at police, they also noted that he “had more firepower than the officer” — possessing a 
weapon with a 23-round magazine. 
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Later in Charlotte, N.C., a young black police officer shot and killed Keith Lamont Scott. 
According to police reports, Scott brandished a weapon and was given multiple commands to 
drop the weapon. After a woman claiming to be Scott’s daughter posted a Facebook Live video 
that asserted that Scott was disabled and only holding a book, riots erupted. The police say 
they’ve not found a book at the scene, but they do have Scott’s weapon. Protests began in late 
afternoon and quickly turned violent. Rioters attacked and injured police officers (including one 
hit in the face with a rock), shut down and set fire to an interstate, threw rocks and other objects 
at motorists, damaged police cars, looted tractor trailers, and eventually looted a Walmart. Police 
reportedly arrested only one person in response to the widespread violence.  
Even when Black Lives Matter activists chant “Pigs in a blanket! Fry ’em like bacon!” — 
and too many of them do — violent rhetoric is not directly responsible for actual violence. But 
Black Lives Matter is responsible for how it reacts to events such as Dallas. And the response of 
many was not only dismissal, but it pushed the agitation to an even higher pitch. That is, after 
Dallas, the response of activists was to willfully create the conditions that make violence more 
likely, not less. When tensions were high — perhaps as high as they have been since the 
movement began — Black Lives Matter opted to escalate the situation.  
Unjust ends are not secured by unjust means, and many in the Black Lives Matter 
movement seem to have forgotten that. At the same time that many demand that law enforcement 
stop forming conclusions based on skin color, many activists form conclusions based solely on 
the presence of a badge. What does “Black Lives Matter” even mean if a black man in uniform 
can’t protect himself from criminal violence — from a person of any color? Does this look like 
“social justice” to you? 
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Appendix F. Pro-BLM Article 
Countless studies, statistics, investigations, and anecdotes tell us that a person’s race can 
determine the kinds of interactions he or she will have with the police — and how likely it is that 
he or she will survive the encounter. At this point, this reality is largely beyond debate. Yet the 
topic of unarmed black people being disproportionately killed by law enforcement officers is 
often dubbed “controversial,” and is framed as an issue about which reasonable people can 
disagree. It is not. 
Many characterize the dilemma as the result of a lack of “trust between police and 
communities.” That obscures the problem. The phrase “black lives matter,” which has been used 
to draw attention to the problem, has inspired its own pushback, with critics suggesting it means 
that “blue” (police) lives, or nonblack lives in general, aren’t important. That’s hugely confused. 
But any sincere confusion about what the Black Lives Matter movement means and what 
motivates critics of racialized police violence should end with the news of the circumstances of 
40-year-old Terence Crutcher’s death in Tulsa, Oklahoma, last week (to say nothing of the police 
shooting in Charlotte, North Carolina, of Keith Lamont Scott on Tuesday night, the details of 
which are still unfolding). After Crutcher’s car stalled on the highway, police responding to a 
call about an abandoned vehicle saw Crutcher — who video shows was following instructions 
and who police have admitted was unarmed — and deemed him “a bad dude” who would need 
to be tasered. Moments later, officer Betty Shelby shot him dead. 
Anyone should be able to see that this was wrong. The fact that it happened, that the 
officer may or may not be held responsible, and that it hasn’t led to national consensus of horror 
and outrage paints a clear, simple picture of the reality that people are protesting against when 
they say “black lives matter.” This shooting, the latest in a long, long string of similar cases, 
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stands out. Because of the specific circumstances, it’s a tragedy that even people who hold 
deeply misguided beliefs about black criminality or intense loyalty to police officers should be 
able to see as such. There are no distractions. Those who can’t identify injustice in this latest 
textbook example of how racial bias can lead to death probably won’t see it anywhere. 
Crutcher’s death proves that you can get killed while doing absolutely nothing wrong (let alone 
anything that justified deadly force).  
His death is a distressing reminder that race informs which people are seen as threats, 
which in turn affects whether police encounters turn adversarial, which in turn determines 
people’s likelihood of being killed. You don’t have to be black to imagine the terror people feel 
knowing that their skin color means there’s a chance they will at some point be seen as a threat, a 
police officer will react to them as such, their every hesitation or terrified motion will be 
interpreted as failure to comply, and they will end up dead. Worse, accountability will be 
unlikely because police are so rarely determined to have improperly used deadly force. And of 
course, even if someone were charged, the person whose skin color set off this chain of events 
would still be dead. 
We don’t have to imagine what the video doesn’t show — that Crutcher probably would 
have survived his car troubles had he been white. Generally, data backs that up, as German 
Lopez has explained: “An analysis of the available FBI data by Vox’s Dara Lind shows that US 
police kill black people at disproportionate rates: They accounted for 31 percent of police killing 
victims in 2012, even though they made up just 13 percent of the US population. Although the 
data is incomplete, since it’s based on voluntary reports from police agencies around the country, 
it highlights the vast disparities in how police use force.” 
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And there’s good reason to believe that racial bias is a factor. Studies show that officers 
are quicker to shoot black suspects in video game simulations. Josh Correll, a University of 
Colorado Boulder psychology professor who conducted the research, said it’s possible the bias 
could lead to even more skewed outcomes in the field. "In the very situation in which [officers] 
most need their training," he said, "we have some reason to believe that their training will be 
most likely to fail them." It’s a reminder that it’s not random tragic mistakes, “bad apples,” or a 
“lack of trust” that kills innocent black people 
In the case of police, all cops are dealing with enormous cultural and systemic forces that 
build racial bias against minority groups. Even if a black cop doesn't view himself as racist, the 
way policing is done in the US is racially skewed — by, for example, targeting high-crime 
neighborhoods that are predominantly black. These policing tactics can also create and 
accentuate personal, subconscious bias by increasing the likelihood that officers will relate 
blackness with criminality or danger — leading to what psychologists call "implicit bias" against 
black Americans. Combined, this means the system as a whole — as well as individual officers, 
even black ones — by and large act in ways that are deeply racially skewed, even if they are not 
consciously aware of it. 
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Appendix G. Trial Transcript 
Judge:  Please be seated.  Court is now in session.  We have before us criminal case, number 94-
143, the State of Missouri vs. Donald Ray Braswell.  The defendant, Mr. Braswell is being 
charged with the crimes of armed robbery and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious 
injury.  The defendant has appeared in this court and has entered a plea of not guilty to the 
charges of armed robbery and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.  I note for 
the record that Dana Nielson is here, representing the state as the prosecutor, and Beth Cochran 
is here as defense counsel for Mr. Donald Ray Braswell.  All right Mrs. Nielson, you may 
proceed with your opening statement. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Thank you, your honor.  Ladies and gentleman of the jury, the 
State of Missouri charges Mr. Donald Ray Braswell of robbing the Kum & Go convenience 
store, on the corner of Washington and 8th Avenue.  He is also charged with shooting and 
seriously injuring the clerk, Mr. Andrew Flynt.  Due to his injuries, Mr. Flynt has no memory of 
the events of February 22nd, 2016.  He is therefore unable to testify for himself about the events 
of that day.  Mrs. Cynthia Easterling, a frequent shopper of the Kum & Go Convenience store, 
who was present at the time the crimes were committed, has identified Mr. Donald Ray Braswell 
as the person who shot Mr. Flynt.  The evidence will show that Mrs. Cynthia Easterling 
positively identified the defendant in a lineup conducted by a member of the Springfield Police 
Department.  The defense will attempt to convince you that the Springfield Police Department 
used biased procedures to construct the lineup.  However, as you will see, the procedures used in 
constructing and administering the lineup were fair and unbiased, and the evidence will show 
that the lineup from which Mrs. Cynthia Easterling identified the defendant was in fact the 
standard lineup used by the Springfield Police Department.  Furthermore, the evidence will show 
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that the circumstances leading up to the arrest of the defendant are highly incriminating, and it is 
our feeling that a close examination of the evidence of this case, will convince you beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty as charged. 
Judge: Thank you, Mrs. Nielson.  Mrs. Cochran, you may make your opening statements. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): Thank you, your honor.  Ladies and gentleman of the jury, the 
defendant, Mr. Donald Ray Braswell has been mistakenly identified by a single eyewitness as the 
man who robbed the Kum & Go convenience store and who shot and injured the clerk, Mr. 
Andrew Flynt.  The evidence will show that the defendant is innocent of the crimes for which he 
has been accused.  You see the defendant, Mr. Donald Ray Braswell, wasn’t at the Kum & Go 
convenience store that day.  You’ll hear testimony from his friend, Mr. Rice that Mr. Donald Ray 
Braswell was home at the time that the crimes occurred—thus it is impossible for him to have 
been the perpetrator.  The evidence will show that Officer Ackerman used biased and unfair 
procedures to construct the lineup from which the eyewitness made her identification.  Ladies 
and gentleman of the jury, substantial questions exist regarding the eyewitness’s memory of the 
crime and the conditions under which she identified the defendant.  Careful attention to the 
evidence today will show that Mrs. Easterling was incorrect in her identification of the 
defendant, and that my client, Mr. Donald Ray Braswell, is innocent of the charges.  Thank You. 
Judge:  Mrs.  Nielson, you may proceed with your first witness. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Thank you, your honor.  I would like to call Cynthia Easterling to 
the stand.  
Judge:  Please raise your right hand.  Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  I do. 
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Judge:  Please be seated. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Mrs. Easterling, will you please state your full name for the record. 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  My name is Cynthia Jane Easterling. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Mrs. Easterling, are you familiar with the Kum & Go convenience 
store on the corner of Washington and 8th Avenue? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  Yes I am.  I often stop in there to buy gas or a soda. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Did you stop at the Kum & Go convenience store on February 22, 
2016? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  Yes I did.  I stopped in there to buy gas at about 8:40pm that 
evening.   
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Could you please tell the jury what events took place that evening? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  Well after I filled up with gas, I went inside and paid the 
cashier, um, I then went to the back to use the restroom.  As I came out, I heard yelling and saw a 
man waving a gun at the cashier.  So, I froze in the entrance to the main area of the store.  I 
didn’t duck or anything, just stood there—I was literally petrified. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Mrs. Easterling, could you please tell the jury what you saw next? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  I saw the cashier give the guy with the gun some money.  
Um, the guy with the gun was swearing and yelling. The guy with the gun seemed to get really 
upset—I guess because it wasn’t enough money—and then he started shouting more obscenities 
even louder while he was shaking the gun at the cashier. Then he shot the clerk and ran out of the 
store. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  What happened next? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  Well after the guy left, I called 911 and the police came. 
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Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Mrs. Easterling, were there any other customers in the store? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  No.  Besides the cashier, I was the only other person in the 
store. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  You said you stood still and didn’t take cover.  Did this allow you 
an opportunity to get a good look at the robber?   
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  Yes I feel like got a good look at him. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Approximately how long were you able to get that good look at the 
robber? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  Um, I’d say about a minute, it felt like two hours. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Were you distracted at all during this time period? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  No I was not. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Did you find that during this time period, you were able to pay 
close attention to the robber’s face? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  Yes, I believe I was able to pay close attention to the 
robber’s face. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Was the robber wearing a mask or a disguise of any kind? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  No he wasn’t. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Mrs. Easterling, is the person you saw rob the Kum & Go 
convenience store in the room at this time? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  Yes he is. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Could you please point to this person? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):(she points to Mr. Donald Ray Braswell) Yes, that’s him 
there. 
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Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Let the record reflect that the witness has identified the defendant, 
Mr. Donald Ray Braswell. 
Judge:  So noted. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Mrs. Easterling, let’s now turn our attention to the events that took 
place after the crime was committed.  Did you at a later date, have an opportunity to view a 
photographic lineup and make an identification of the robber? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  Yes I did. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  And after the robbery occurred, how confident were you that you 
would be able to make a positive identification? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  I was pretty sure that I would be able to make an 
identification from a lineup, assuming the guy was there. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  How confident were you immediately after having made the 
identification? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  Um, I was 95% sure that the person I selected from the 
lineup was the robber.  Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  And Mrs. Easterling, how confident are 
you now that your identification was correct? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  I’m still 95% confident that my decision was correct.   
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Thank you, your honor.  Mrs. Easterling, how many lineups did 
you view the day that you identified Mr. Donald Ray Braswell? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  I only saw one lineup. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  And how long did it take you to identify the man that you believed 
to have been the robber? 
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Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  I didn’t have to finish looking at all the men in the lineup. As 
soon as I saw the defendant I recognized him.   
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Could you please describe to the court, what if anything, the police 
officer said to you prior to viewing the lineup.   
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  Well before I saw the lineup, the police officer read me some 
instructions.  Um, he told me that he would be showing me a photographic lineup of men that 
may or may not contain the person who committed the crime.  He told me that I’d be seeing each 
photograph individually and that I’d need to make a decision after each one.  Um, he told me that 
I couldn’t go back and see a lineup member that I’d seen before and he couldn’t tell me how 
many line-up members that I would be seeing.  He read to me that I, um, should keep in mind 
that hairstyles, beards and mustaches could easily be changed, so I should look at each line-up 
member carefully, and after each one I should tell him whether I saw the person who committed 
the crime.  Then he read to me that I shouldn’t tell anyone else whether I had identified anyone. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Thank you Mrs. Easterling, I have no further questions. 
Judge:  Mrs. Cochran, your witness. 
Defense (Beth Cochran):  Thank you, your honor.  Mrs. Easterling, did you view mug shots of 
robbery suspects of any kind between the robbery and the lineup identification? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  No I did not. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): And how long was it from the robbery to the day you identified my 
client from the photographic lineup. 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  It was about 2 weeks.  
Defense (Beth Cochran): Mrs. Easterling, could you please tell us the description of the robber 
that you gave to the police? 
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Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  Yes, I described him as being a black guy, about 25 to 30 
years old, 5’10, about 175lbs.  Um, his hair was buzzed.  He was wearing a pair of white shorts, 
a yellow t-shirt, and white tennis shoes.  
Yes, I described him as being a white guy, about 25 to 30 years old, 5’10, about 175lbs.  
Um, his hair was buzzed.  He was wearing a pair of white shorts, a yellow t-shirt, and white 
tennis shoes. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): And how did the members of the lineup dress?  Were any of them 
wearing the same clothes that you described? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  No, none of them were wearing the clothes that I had 
described.  Of course, I could only see the shirt each man in the photograph was wearing, but 
none of them were wearing the same kind of shirt. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): Now, generally speaking, did most of the people in the lineup match 
the description of the person you saw rob the convenience store? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  No, not really.  A couple of them were too heavy, one of 
them was lighter-skinned, and one was white.  No, not really.  A couple of them were too 
heavy, one of them was darker-skinned, and one was black.   
Defense (Beth Cochran): Mrs. Easterling, how many people were in the line-up? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  There were 6 men in the line-up. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): You said earlier that you stop at this store often? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  Yes, that is where I usually stop to get gas when I need it. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): Is it possible that you recognize the defendant not from the day of the 
robbery, but from one of your earlier stops at the store? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling): No, I don’t think so. 
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Defense (Beth Cochran):  How many of the five men in the lineup looked like the man you 
described to the police?  
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  Only one man did, Mr. Braswell.   
Defense (Beth Cochran):  Let me make sure that I understand your testimony Mrs. Easterling.  
It is your testimony that there is no chance that you identified Mr. Braswell because he was the 
only man in the lineup that looked similar to the description you gave police. 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling): Well, um, I identified him because he’s the man I saw that 
robbed the store. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): And you are completely sure without any doubt that you recognized 
Mr. Braswell from the robbery and not from a previous time you were at the Kum & Go. 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling): I am pretty confident that it was from the day of the robbery.   
Defense (Beth Cochran): Pretty sure, but not 100% completely sure right Mrs. Easterling? 
Witness #1 (Cynthia Easterling):  Almost, but not completely 100%.  
Defense (Beth Cochran): Thank you, I have no further questions. 
Judge:  Mrs. Easterling, you may step down.   
Judge: Mrs.  Nielson, you may call the next witness. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Thank you, your honor.  At this time, the state wishes to call 
Officer Paul Ackerman, to the stand. 
Judge:  Officer Ackerman, raise your right hand.  Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  I do. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Officer Ackerman, will you please state your full name for the 
record? 
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Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  My name is Paul Douglas Ackerman. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  And what is your occupation? 
Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  I’m a police officer with the Springfield Police Department. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Officer Ackerman, have you been involved at all in the 
investigation of the robbery of the Kum & Go convenience store, which took place on February 
22, 2016? 
Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  Yes I was. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  And in what capacity were you involved? 
Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  I was the chief investigating officer.  I took the witness’s 
statement immediately following the crime.  I organized and conducted the lineup. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Could you please tell the court how it is that the defendant was 
picked up and charged with this crime? 
Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  The defendant was picked up at about 10 blocks from the 
crime scene, for loitering and suspicious behavior in front of another small convenience store.  
He matched the description of the perpetrator given by Mrs. Easterling and based on that 
information was held, placed under arrest, and taken to the Springfield Police Department.  He 
was released on bond, but we had his mugshot to use in a photographic lineup. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Officer Ackerman, in your experiences with the police force, about 
how many photographic lineups have you been involved with? 
Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  I’ve conducted at least 50 lineups in other cases. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Prior to having Mrs. Easterling view the photo lineup, did you say 
anything to her? 
Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  I instructed her on the lineup that she would be seeing. 
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Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  And what were those instructions? 
Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  Well, they were the standard instructions for a lineup used by 
the Springfield Police Department. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Could you please recite those for the Court? 
Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  Yes. I have them right here. “The photo array of men you are 
about to see might or might not contain the person who committed the crime.  Each lineup 
member will be presented individually and you must make a decision after viewing each one.  
You cannot go back to see a lineup member whom you have already viewed and I cannot tell you 
how many lineup members you are going to see. Please keep in mind that hairstyles, beards and 
mustaches can easily be changed.  I want you to look at each lineup member carefully and after 
each one, tell me whether you see the person who committed the crime.  Please do not tell 
anyone else whether you have identified anyone.” 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Thank you very much.  Officer Ackerman, was there anything 
unusual about the procedure used to construct the photo array? 
Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  No.  Like I said, the procedures I used to conduct the lineup 
were standard procedures used by the Springfield Police Department.  In fact, the Springfield 
procedures are designed to avoid suggestiveness, and this particular administration was carefully 
conducted to ensure its fairness. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Officer Ackerman, is it true that Mrs. Easterling, the eyewitness, 
identified the defendant, Mr. Donald Ray Braswell, from the line-up, as the man who robbed the 
convenience store? 
Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  Yes she did. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Thank you, Officer Ackerman.  I have no further questions. 
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Judge:  Mrs. Cochran, your witness. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): Thank you, your honor.  Officer Ackerman, let’s consider the lineup 
from which witness picked the defendant.  You were in charge of determining the composition of 
the lineup and of administering it to the witness, were you not? 
Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  Yes, I was responsible for everything. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): Is there an established procedure for constructing a lineup? 
Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  We have a database of mugshots at the station, so we select 
five or six people who look like the perpetrator and those are the people we use as fillers in the 
photo array. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): Did any of the other men in the lineup have all the characteristics 
described by the eyewitness of the crime? 
Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  No.   
Defense (Beth Cochran): So then you were wrong when you said that you selected five or six 
people as fillers who look like the perpetrator because you actually only picked one person in 
this case that looked like the perpetrator? 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Objection. 
Judge:  Sustained.  
Defense (Beth Cochran): Would it be fair to say that the only person that resembled the 
perpetrator in this lineup was the defendant? 
Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  Yes, but only because he is the one that Mrs. Easterling 
described and identified as the robber. 
Defense (Beth Cochran):  Are you aware that instructing a witness on possible appearance 
changes can make them more likely to mistakenly identify somebody? 
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Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  No I was not aware of that.  Our procedures are fair. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): Officer Ackerman, was the gun that was used to shoot the clerk, 
Andrew Flynt, ever found? 
Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  No, we searched the area surrounding the premises, but were 
unable to locate it. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): Did you search my client’s apartment for the gun? 
Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  Yes we did. 
Defense Attorney (Beth Cochran): And were you able to locate the gun there? 
Witness #2 (Officer Ackerman):  No, we were still unable to locate the gun there. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): Thank you, your honor.  I have no further questions for this witness. 
Judge:  Officer Ackerman, you may step down.  Mrs. Nielson, you may call your next witness. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Thank you, your honor.  The state rests at this time. 
Judge:  Mrs. Cochran, you may call your first witness. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): Thank you, your honor.  The defense would like to call Daniel Rice to 
the stand. 
Judge:  Raise your right hand.  Mr. Rice, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice):  I do. 
Judge:  Please be seated. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): Mr. Rice, would you please state your full name for the record?  
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice):  My name is Daniel Martin Rice. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): Mr. Rice, what is your relationship to the defendant, Donald Ray 
Braswell? 
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Witness #3 (Daniel Rice):  Donald Ray is a close friend from childhood. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): Are you familiar with the Kum & Go convenience store located on 
the corner of Washington and 8th? 
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice):  Yes, I get beer there sometimes.  It’s just a few blocks from my 
house. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): Approximately how long does it take you to get to the Kum & Go 
from your apartment? 
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice): It’s not too far.  I would say it’s about a 5-minute drive. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): Could you please tell the jury where you were at approximately 
8:30pm on the evening of February 22, 2016? 
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice):  Sure.  I was at home watching the basketball game. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): Was there anyone else there with you that evening? 
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice):  Yeah, Donald, was with me. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): Was Donald Ray with you the entire evening? 
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice):  Well, he was supposed to be.  He came for pizza and beer, we started 
watching the game, and then he had to run home real quick because we needed a little more beer 
and he thought he had some there.  Then he was gonna come back. 
Defense (Beth Cochran):  How far away does Donald Ray live? 
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice):  About a 10 minute drive. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): At approximately what time did he leave? 
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice):  I remember it was right at the end of the third quarter, and flipping 
channels I saw the Rules of Engagement was just coming on, so I would say between 8:30 and 
8:40 p.m.. 
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Defense (Beth Cochran): Did you see or speak to him again after that? 
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice): Yeah I called him at around 8:45 to tell him to stop off at the store to 
get some chips for me. 
Defense (Beth Cochran):  And did he sound normal? 
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice):  He sounded like he was a touch out of breath, but he was in a hurry 
to get back—he said he was just walking out of his house.  He realized he didn’t have beer at 
home, so he was going to go to the store anyway. 
Defense (Beth Cochran):  And did you see or hear from him after that? 
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice):  Nope, he got arrested before he could come back. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): While you were hanging out with Donald Ray that night at your 
house, did you notice anything unusual about his voice or behavior? 
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice):  You know, I really didn’t notice anything out of the ordinary.  I 
knew he was a little short on money per usual, but that was always the case.  
Defense (Beth Cochran): So just to be clear, how would you describe Donald’s demeanor that 
evening as you guys watched the game? 
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice):  His demeanor was just as it always is.  Actually, he seemed to be in 
good spirits all things considered.   
Defense (Beth Cochran): Mr. Rice, to your knowledge, has Donald Ray Braswell ever owned a 
gun? 
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice):  No, not that I’m aware of. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): Thank you, Mr. Rice.  I have no further questions. 
Judge:  Your witness, Mrs. Nielson. 
78 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Thank you, your honor.  Mr. Rice, you said Mr. Braswell was 
chronically short on money. 
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice):  Yes, I suppose. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Did you form the impression over time that he would’ve been 
happier—generally speaking—if he wasn’t always so short on money. 
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice):  Ha, well wouldn’t we all? 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Well sure, but would you say that Donald Ray was a little more 
preoccupied with this issue than most other people? 
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice):  Yes.  Um, he tended to talk about it a lot. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Did you sense, generally speaking, that he was angry about his 
money situation?  
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice):  Perhaps, generally speaking because he hated his job.  That doesn’t 
mean he would go rob a store and shoot somebody. 
Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  OK, and you said he was actually in good spirits before he left 
your house the night of the crime? 
Witness #3 (Daniel Rice):  Well, yes. 
 Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Interesting…Thank you, your honor.  I have no further questions 
for this witness. 
Judge:  Mrs. Cochran, you may call your next witness. 
Defense (Beth Cochran): Your honor, at this time, the defense rests. 
Judge:  Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, we will now proceed with the closing arguments.  The 
prosecution will go first, and then the defense will proceed.  Mrs. Nielson, you may now begin 
with your closing arguments. 
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Prosecutor (Dana Nielson):  Thank you, your honor.  Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, today 
you have heard the case against the defendant, Mr. Donald Ray Braswell.  The defendant stands 
accused of robbing the Kum & Go convenience store on the corner of 8th Avenue and 
Washington.  He also stands accused of shooting and severely injuring the clerk, Mr. Andrew 
Flynt.  And as a representative of the state of Missouri, it’s my job to prove to you beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Donald Ray Braswell committed these crimes.  Today you have heard 
the testimony of Mrs. Cynthia Easterling, the eyewitness to the crimes that were committed.  
You heard her testify that the person who she saw commit these crimes at the Kum & Go 
convenience store was in fact, the defendant.  She positively identified the defendant in a police 
lineup.  Now also within this trial, you heard the testimony of Officer Ackerman of the 
Springfield Police force.  Officer Ackerman was the chief investigating officer on this crime.  
You heard Officer Ackerman describe the standard procedures used in instructing eyewitnesses,  
choosing photographs for the lineup, and the standard procedure for presenting these 
photographs to the eyewitness in a police lineup.  You also heard Officer Ackerman testify that 
these standard procedures were the ones used in the creation and administration of the lineup in 
this case, and that these procedures are designed to reduce suggestiveness.  He also testified that 
this particular police line-up was conducted in an unbiased and fair manner.  Finally, you heard 
the defendant’s close friend and supposed alibi witness indicate the Defendant’s chronic 
preoccupation with his lack of money, which establishes a clear motive for his committing these 
crimes.  Ladies and gentleman, I believe that upon close examination of the evidence that was 
presented here today at this trial, you will be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant, Mr. Donald Ray Braswell, is guilty as charged. 
Judge:  Thank you, Mrs. Nielson.  Mrs. Cochran, you may proceed with your closing arguments. 
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Defense (Beth Cochran):  Thank you, your honor.  Ladies and gentleman of the jury, today you 
have heard testimony from a couple of witnesses stating that the defendant, Mr. Braswell, is 
guilty of the charges.  However, we cannot conclude from the evidence that he committed this 
crime.  Reasonable doubt exists as to who committed these crimes, and you must therefore, in 
the interest of justice, find him not guilty.  Let’s go back to the testimony that we heard today.  
First, we heard the testimony of Mr. Rice, the defendant’s good friend.  He testified to a number 
of important pieces of information.  First, he testified that the defendant was at his apartment and 
that he then went directly home, demonstrating that he was not near the store at the time the 
crimes were committed.  Mr. Rice knows Donald Ray went directly home because he spoke to 
him on the phone as he left there.  Additionally, Mr. Rice testified that he asked Donald Ray to 
go to the store and that Donald Ray needed to go to the store anyway—this explains why the 
Defendant was out when the police apprehended him.  Finally, he testified that to his knowledge, 
the defendant does not own a gun.   
The only incriminating evidence is the testimony of Mrs. Easterling, a single eyewitness.  
She is a well intentioned woman who has mistakenly identified the defendant from a biased 
lineup.  In evaluating the evidence, you should consider the procedure used to construct the 
lineup.  The suspects used in the line-up were biased against my client because only my client 
actually matched the description of the perpetrator.   .  Also, the instructions given to the witness 
were biased against my client because they included information about possible changes in the 
perpetrator’s appearance.  Such change-of-appearance instructions can cause a witness to choose 
when he or she is uncertain. These factors led to a mistaken identification of the defendant; 
therefore, you must vote to acquit my client, Mr. Braswell.  Thank you. 
Judge:  Members of the jury, I thank you for your attention during this trial.  Please pay 
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attention to the instructions I am about to give you. It’s my duty to instruct you on the rules of 
law that you must use in deciding this case.  Your decision must be based only on the evidence 
presented during the trial.  You must not be influenced in any way by either sympathy for or 
prejudice against the Defendant or the Government. You must follow the law as I explain it – 
even if you do not agree with the law  – and you must follow all of my instructions as a whole. 
You must not single out or disregard any of the Court's instructions on the law. 
 The indictment or formal charge against a Defendant isn’t evidence of guilt.  The law 
presumes every Defendant is innocent. The constitution requires the state to prove its accusations 
against the defendant, and therefore it is up to the state to prove the defendant’s guilt by 
evidence. The defendant exercised his right of choosing not to be a witness in this case.  You 
must not view this as an admission of guilt nor should you be influenced in any way by his 
decision.   
 The Government's burden of proof is heavy, but it doesn’t have to prove a Defendant's 
guilt beyond all possible doubt.  The Government's proof only has to exclude any "reasonable 
doubt" concerning the Defendant's guilt. Mr. Donald Ray Braswell, the defendant in this case, is 
accused of the armed robbery of the Kum & Go and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting 
serious injury of Andrew Flynt. A "reasonable doubt" is a real doubt, based on your reason and 
common sense after you’ve carefully and impartially considered all the evidence in the case. A 
reasonable doubt is not a possible doubt, speculative, imaginary or forced doubt.  Such a doubt 
must not influence you to return a verdict of not guilty if you have an abiding conviction of guilt.  
A reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant may arise from the evidence, conflict in the 
evidence, or lack of evidence. “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt” is proof so convincing that you 
would be willing to rely and act on it without hesitation in the most important of your own 
82 
affairs. It is to the evidence introduced upon this trial and to it alone, that you are to look for that 
proof. 
 As I said before, you must consider only the evidence that I have admitted in the case. You 
must disregard or ignore any evidence that I may have ordered as evidence to be stricken from 
the testimony or disregarded by you good members of the jury.  That means that when you are 
deciding the case, you must not consider that inadmissible evidence.  Evidence includes the 
testimony of witnesses and the exhibits admitted.  But, anything the lawyers say is not evidence 
and isn’t binding on you. Remember, the lawyers are not on trial. Your feelings about them 
should not influence your decisions in this case. You shouldn’t assume from anything I’ve said 
that I have any opinion about any factual issue in this case. You should use your common sense 
in deciding which is the best evidence and which evidence should not be relied upon when 
considering your verdict. You must find some of the evidence not reliable or less reliable than 
other evidence. 
 When I say you must consider all the evidence, I don’t mean that you must accept all the 
evidence as true or accurate. You should consider how the witnesses acted as well as what they 
said.  You should decide whether you believe what each witness had to say, and how important 
that testimony was.  In making that decision you may believe or disbelieve any witness, in whole 
or in part.  To decide whether you believe any witness I suggest that you ask yourself a few 
questions: Did the witness impress you as one who was telling the truth? Did the witness have 
any particular reason not to tell the truth? Did the witness have a personal interest in the outcome 
of the case?  Did the witness seem to have a good memory?  Did the witness have the 
opportunity and ability to accurately observe the things he or she testified about?  Did the 
witness's testimony differ from other testimony or other evidence?  
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 These are some general rules that apply to your verdict decision.  You must follow these 
rules in order to return a lawful verdict. Before you can find the defendant guilty of assault with 
a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, the state must prove the following three elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) Andrew Flynt was seriously injured; 2) That this occurred as a 
consequence of the use of a deadly weapon; 3) Donald Ray Braswell was the person who 
actually injured Andrew Flynt.  The crime of robbery is taking of money or other property of 
value from the person or custody from another by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.  
Before you can find the defendant guilty of armed robbery the state must prove the following 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) larceny or attempted larceny occurred at the Kum & Go; 
2) from a person or the presence of a person; 3) with the use or threatened use of a dangerous 
weapon; 4) Donald Ray Braswell was the person who actually committed these acts.  Remember 
that, in a very real way, you’re judges – judges of the facts.  Your only interest is to seek the 
truth from the evidence in the case. 
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Appendix H. Verdict Questionnaire 
 
Instructions:  Please answer the following questions. 
1.  As a juror in this case, do you find the defendant Donald Ray Braswell: 
Guilty   Not Guilty 
 
2.  Please rate how confident you are about this judgment (circle appropriate number) 
0% 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50% 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100% 
 
3.  Please indicate the likelihood that the defendant is guilty on a scale from 0-100%, where 0% 
indicates zero likelihood that he is guilty and 100% indicates that you are positive he is guilty. 
0% 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50% 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100% 
 
For the following questions, please make an “X” in one of the boxes to indicate your opinion of 
the person in question.  
Please rate the defense attorney, Beth Cochran, on the following characteristics:  
Likeable        Not likeable 
Inarticulate        Well- spoken 
Persuasive        Not Persuasive 
Competent        Incompetent 
Unintelligent        Intelligent 
 
 Please rate the prosecuting attorney, Dana Nielson, on the following characteristics: 
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Likeable        Not likeable 
Inarticulate        Well- spoken 
Persuasive        Not Persuasive 
Competent        Incompetent 
Unintelligent        Intelligent 
 
Please rate the eyewitness, Cynthia Easterling, on the following characteristics: 
Likeable        Not likeable 
Inarticulate        Well- spoken 
Persuasive        Not Persuasive 
Competent        Incompetent 
Unintelligent        Intelligent 
 
Please rate the arresting police officer, Paul Ackerman, on the following characteristics: 
Likeable        Not likeable 
Inarticulate        Well- spoken 
Persuasive        Not Persuasive 
Competent        Incompetent 
Unintelligent        Intelligent 
 
Please rate the defendant’s friend, Daniel Rice, on the following characteristics: 
Likeable        Not likeable 
Inarticulate        Well- spoken 
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Persuasive        Not Persuasive 
Competent        Incompetent 
Unintelligent        Intelligent 
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Appendix I. Defendant Photographs 
 
 
Defendant 1   Defendant 2   Defendant 3 
 
 
 
 
Defendant 4   Defendant 5   Defendant 6   
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Appendix J. CoBRAS 
Rate the following on a scale of 0-5, with 0 indicating strongly disagree and 5 indicating 
strongly agree: 
1. White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin. 
2. Race is very important in determining who is successful and who is not. 
3. Race plays an important role in who gets sent to prison.  
4. Race plays a major role in the type of social services (such as type of health care or day 
care) that people receive in the U.S. 
5. Racial and ethnic minorities do not have the same opportunities as white people in the 
U.S. 
6. Everyone who works hard, no matter what race they are, has an equal chance to become 
rich. 
7. White people are more to blame for racial discrimination than racial and ethnic 
minorities. 
8. Social policies, such as affirmative action, discriminate unfairly against white people. 
9. White people in the U.S. are discriminated against because of the color of their skin. 
10. English should be the only official language in the U.S. 
11. Due to racial discrimination, programs such as affirmative action are necessary to help 
create equality. 
12. Racial and ethnic minorities in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of 
their skin.  
13. It is important that people begin to think of themselves as American and not African 
American, Mexican American or Italian American. 
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14. Immigrants should try to fit into the culture and values of the U.S. 
15. Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations. 
16. Talking about racial issues causes unnecessary tension. 
17. Racism is a major problem in the U.S. 
18. It is important for public schools to teach about the history and contributions of racial and 
ethnic minorities. 
19. It is important for political leaders to talk about racism to help work through or solve 
society's problems. 
20. Racism may have been a problem in the past, it is not an important problem today. 
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Appendix K. POPS 
Rate on a scale of 0-4 with 0 indicating strongly disagree and 4 indicating strongly agree: 
1. Police officers are friendly 
2. Police officers protect me 
3. Police officers treat all people fairly 
4. I like the police 
5. The police are good people 
6. The police do not discriminate 
7. The police provide safety 
8. The police are helpful 
9. The police are trustworthy 
10. The police are reliable 
11. Police officers are unbiased 
12. Police officers care about my community 
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Appendix L. Demographics Questionnaire 
 
1. Gender (select one)    FEMALE          MALE TRANSGENDER OTHER  
2. What is your age?_________ 
3. What is your occupation? _____________ 
4. How many children do you have, if any? _________ 
            How many of your children are under age 18? _____ 
5. Which of the following statements best describes your highest educational achievement? 
            ____ Some high school 
            ____ High school graduate (or GED) 
            ____ Trade school 
            ____ Some college 
            ____ College graduate 
            ____ Some graduate school 
            ____ Graduate degree 
6. What is your ethnicity? (circle one) 
            Hispanic 
            Non-Hispanic 
7.  What is your race? 
            Native American/Alaska Native 
            Asian 
            African-American 
            Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 
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            White 
8. What is your current marital status? 
            Single                           Married 
            Divorced                       Widowed 
9. Which of the following best describes your income before taxes? 
            ___ Less than 20,000    ___20,000-30,000 
            ___30,000-45,000         ___45,000-60,000 
            ___60,000-75,000         ___More than 75,000 
  
10. Which of these opinions best represents your views? 
1              2               3                 4                 5                           6                7 
        Extremely   Liberal      Slightly    Moderate       Slightly     Conservative    Extremely 
            Liberal                      Liberal                       Conservative                      Conservative 
                         
11. Which of the following best characterizes your religious affiliation? 
Agnostic 
Atheist 
Buddhist 
Christian 
Hindu 
Jewish 
Muslim 
Pagan 
Other 
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Appendix M. Consent Form One: Reading Comprehension and the Media 
The purpose of this research is to examine reading comprehension of modern newspaper 
articles. We plan to have approximately 250 participants in this study. If you decide to 
participate, you will be asked to read some articles online and answer questions about the 
articles—in order to qualify for the follow-up session and receive credit, you must correctly 
recall information from the articles you read and complete all other parts of the online 
session.  The online component you are about to complete should take approximately 15 
minutes. 
For the follow-up session, you will listen to an audio recording and answer some 
questions about it. Participation should take about 45 minutes to 1 hour, and you are required to 
complete both sessions in order to receive credit. 
There are few foreseeable risks for participating in this research; while unlikely, 
you may experience slight psychological discomfort from some of the material presented. 
You will receive course credit for participating.  Benefits to you are the positive educational 
experience of participating in important research, and the potential benefits to society are 
increased knowledge of human perception. 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You have a right to refuse to 
participate without consequences. If you decide not to participate your decision will not affect 
your relationship with Missouri State University or any of the researchers involved with this 
study. If you decide to participate you may discontinue participation at any time. You may refuse 
to answer any specific questions or refuse to engage in any task at any time during the study. 
Withdrawal or refusing to answer specific questions or engage in specific tasks will not result in 
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any consequences to you and will not affect your relationship with Missouri State University or 
any of the researchers involved with this study. 
Gift Card Lottery Incentive.  If you complete both sessions of this study and provide 
your contact information in a link at the end of the second study session, you will be entered 
into two separate drawings, each for a $100 visa gift card, that will occur before the end of the 
Fall 2018 semester. 
Your responses to all of the questions will remain confidential.  Information gathered 
from you will be stored on password protected computers, and all of your responses will be 
completely confidential. By checking the box below you indicate that you have read this consent 
form, that you fully understand the nature and consequences of participation and that you have 
had all questions regarding participation in this study answered satisfactorily. 
If you have further questions about this research please feel free to contact the Principal 
Investigator David Zimmerman (dzimmerman@missouristate.edu) or Co-Investigator Emily 
Nerness (klug91@live.missouristate.edu).  If you have any questions regarding your rights as a 
research participant please feel free to contact the Missouri State University Institutional Review 
Board Office at irb@missouristate.edu, or by phone at 417-836-8362 OR 417-836-8991. 
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Appendix N. Consent Form Two: Jury Decision Making 
Researchers at Missouri State University are asking you to take part in a study on 
jury decision making.  The researchers want to learn more about juror decision making.  You 
will listen to an audio recording of a felony trial and provide ratings of the trial participants and 
the evidence. You will also complete surveys about your attitudes related to the case and other 
relevant topics. Because a trial requires basic attention to the information being presented, the 
first half of this study screened participants to identify who would be able to sufficiently focus on 
the material being presented to be able to provide an informed verdict. The research should take 
about one hour to complete.                                                   
There are few foreseeable risks for participating in this research; while unlikely, 
you may experience slight psychological discomfort from some of the material 
presented.  You will receive course credit for participating.  Benefits to you are the positive 
educational experience of participating in important research, and the potential benefits to 
society are increased knowledge about juror decision making. 
Taking part is voluntary.  You have a right to refuse to participate without 
consequences. If you decide not to participate your decision will not affect your relationship with 
Missouri State University or any of the researchers involved with this study. If you decide to 
participate you may discontinue participation at any time. You may refuse to answer any specific 
questions or refuse to engage in any task at any time during the study. Withdrawal or refusing to 
answer specific questions or engage in specific tasks will not result in any consequences to you 
and will not affect your relationship with Missouri State University or any of the researchers 
involved with this study. 
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Gift Card Lottery Incentive.  If you complete both sessions of this study and provide 
your contact information in a link at the end of this study session, you will be entered into 
two separate drawings, each for a $100 visa gift card, that will occur before the end of the Fall 
2018 semester. 
Your responses to all of the questions will remain confidential.  Information gathered 
from you will be stored on password protected computers, and all of your responses will be 
completely confidential. By checking the box below you indicate that you have read this consent 
form, that you fully understand the nature and consequences of participation and that you have 
had all questions regarding participation in this study answered satisfactorily.                  
If you have questions about the study, please ask the researcher or contact the Principal 
Investigator, David Zimmerman (dzimmerman@missouristate.edu) or Co-Investigator, Emily 
Nerness (klug91@live.missouristate.edu). If you have any questions regarding your rights as a 
research participant please feel free to contact the Missouri State University Institutional Review 
Board Office at irb@missouristate.edu, or by phone at 417-836-8362 OR 417-836-8991. 
